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ABSTRACT
This study was undertaken to determine the therapeutic action of working in the
symbolic order. Lacan critiques psychoanalytic theory for reducing psychoanalysis to a
therapy of the imaginary, thus ignoring the true significance of Freud’s discovery.
A review of contemporary accounts of therapeutic action established
interpretation, the clinical relationship, and the position of the analyst as key identifiers of
a theory of therapeutic action. The case of Dora was utilized to identify Freud’s theory of
therapeutic action. Lacan’s critique of Freud’s case in “Intervention on Transference”
resulted in an explication of Lacan’s theory of therapeutic action, particularly in regards
to the differentiation of the imaginary and the symbolic.
The study clarified the significance of the difference between working in the
symbolic rather than the imaginary order. It was found that Lacanian theory and practice
place a distinctive focus on unconscious desire, alterity, structure, and fantasy. The
findings suggest that Lacanian theory and practice offer a unique alternative to
contemporary accounts of therapeutic action. As such it is hoped that Lacanian theory
and practice will be better represented and utilized in the field of clinical social work.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This study uses a theoretical approach to examine therapeutic action and Lacan’s
concept of the symbolic order. Freud’s case of Dora will serve as a background for the
discussion. Contemporary accounts of therapeutic action and the position of the analyst
will be explored. Lacan’s critique of Dora will provide an opening to an explication of
Lacan’s assertion that therapeutic action takes place at the level of the symbolic. Thus
answering the research question: How can Lacan’s critique of Freud’s case of Dora
demonstrate the therapeutic action of working from the symbolic order? A summary of
the case material of Dora can be found at the end of this chapter.Following this
introduction, Chapter Two will survey the phenomenon of therapeutic action. Chapter
Three will examine Freud’s therapeutic action utilizing the case of Dora. Chapter Four
will focus upon Lacan’s critique of the case of Dora. Chapter Five will synthesize and
elaborate upon Lacan’s therapeutic action.
Therapeutic Action
The paper’s first chapter will begin with a review of the literature on therapeutic
action. Therapeutic action is, simply put, “what works” in analysis. Theories of
therapeutic action include the goal of therapy and the method by which to achieve that
goal. Stated most generally, the typical aim of psychoanalysis is change and this change
is brought about through interpretation, or a mutative relationship with the analyst. The
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paper will look at the difficulty of discussing therapeutic action across schools, as well as
the hope for a scientific resolution to the question of therapeutic action.
The chapter will give specific attention to Strachey’s paper on therapeutic action
and then proceed to Loewald’s, both of which were influential in the increased focus on
the relationship rather than on “classical” interpretation. Strachey (1934) began this
process by emphasizing the role of the analytic relationship in the mutative interpretation.
The analyst, in his view, becomes a less harsh super-ego internalized by the patient.
Loewald (1960) further emphasized the internalizaiton of the analyst and utilized a
“reparenting” model, similar to the contemporaneous development of Winnicott’s
“holding” or Bion’s “containment”. This emphasis on the reparative aspects of the
relationship was far removed from Freud’s “archeological” metaphor and emphasis on
accurate interpretation.
The shifts shown above already highlight an important aspect of this chapter: the
connection between the position of the analyst and therapeutic action. Thus, focus will
not rely solely on theories of therapeutic action. Contemporary debate concerning the
phenomenon of therapeutic action will lead to a focus on the position of the analyst.
Position of the Analyst
Similarly to therapeutic action the position of the analyst lies somewhere between
theory and technique. One can think of Freud’s “evenly hovering attention” or Anna
Freud’s “equidistance” from the id, ego, or superego. For these introduce a metaphor of
position and distance. Likewise, the contemporary accounts of therapeutic action will be
shown to have similar metaphors (though these will tend to be more relational in nature).
For example, this includes that of a “container”, a “parent-infant relationship”, or a “co-
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creator”. Position of the analyst corresponds to the groupings mentioned above: the
continuum of interpretation versus relationship, defining mutative interpretation, and
describing the clinical relationship. These key aspects that demarcate the position of the
analyst will later be applied to Freud and Lacan and will provide the motor force behind
answering the research question: what does it mean to work at the symbolic?
Interpretation and the Clinical Relationship
The two main categories used to discuss therapeutic action are interpretation and
the clinical relationship. Kernberg (2007) reviews eight papers presented in a recent
issue of Psychoanalytic Quarterly dedicated entirely to a discussion of therapeutic action.
The authors represent the full range of contemporary psychoanalytic thought, including:
Kleinian, Ego Psychology, Self Psychology, Relational, and Lacanian. Kernberg finds
four themes: interpretation versus relationship, modification of intervention in response
to varying psychopathology, the effect of therapeutic orientation on technique, and the
use of countertransference (Kernberg, 2007).
These articles will provide background on the most salient features of the factors
determining a clinician’s therapeutic action: the continuum of interpretation versus
relationship, defining mutative interpretation, and describing the clinical relationship.
Mitchell’s simple but helpful summary of three basic models of psychoanalysis will be
used: the drive-conflict model, the developmental-arrest model, and the relational model
(Mitchell, 1988). This will provide the opportunity to show, albeit in a less sophisticated
way than later, the relationship between a theory of therapeutic action and the position of
the analyst. Following Chapter Two, the phenomenon will be explored through theories
of Freud in Chapter Three and Lacan in Chapter Four.
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Freud and the Case of Dora
The case of Dora has received a lot of attention, both as Freud’s first major case
study and as an acknowledged failure. There have been many explanations for this
failure and from a variety of sources, but almost all the critiques center upon the
transference-countertransference relationship (Bernheimer & Kahane, 1990). Indeed, it
was at the end of this case study that Freud acknowledged the central importance of
transference (Freud, 1963). Therefore, the case of Dora is well suited for exploring
transference and countertransference and its importance to the therapeutic action of
psychoanalytic and long-term psychodynamic therapy. However, transferencecountertransference is only one aspect of the position of the analyst.
Lacan and the Symbolic
The second theory will be Lacan. This too must be limited in scope. The chapter
will primarily draw upon “Intervention on Transference”. This does not include Lacan’s
later shifts and developments of his theory, though some reference will be made to these
developments as necessary. As stated above, in examining the case of Dora there is an
advantage to utilizing Lacan, because he wrote an article (“Intervention on
Transference”) on the case. His response centers around the transference and
interpretation, and is instructive as to the position of the analyst and therapeutic action.
Lacan (1957) critiques Freud on three accounts: he mistook Dora’s heterosexuality as
“natural, rather than normative”, he let himself identify with Herr K, and he responded on
the imaginary rather than symbolic level to Dora.
Lacan’s critique of Freud will be presented, examining the main points above, and
subsequently illustrating Lacan’s therapeutic action and position of the analyst. Some
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have drawn attention to Lacan’s refusal to acknowledge any therapeutic action as a
means of emphasizing psychoanalytic process and differentiating it from psychotherapy
(Aisenstein, 2007). Kernberg (2007) notes that this focus distinguishes Lacanian theory
from its contemporaries. However, there are occasions when Lacan states fairly clearly
what his idea of therapeutic action (the aim and technique) of psychoanalysis is (though
this changes in different periods of his writing). And certainly, this is closely related to
his idea of a position of the analyst.
The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to effect a change. Lacan, in the 1950s,
used the model of empty and full speech. In this case the therapeutic action is to lead the
patient to “full” speech (Evans, 1996). That is, for the patient to articulate the truth of his
desire. This means a change in the subject’s position. The analyst, to lead this process,
also must “adopt a position”. And this must mean, “working in the symbolic” (Malone
and Friedlander, 2000). The analyst is “the instrument which enables the patient to make
a ‘full’ statement” (Nobus, 2000, p. 66). Now this technique can best be accomplished
by doing away with “the interferences in symbolic relations created by the imaginary”
(Fink in Malone & Friedlander, 2000, p. 163).
Already we see it will take significant work to make this comprehensible. A host
of terms must be made clear before their interrelation can be understood satisfactorily.
That is, after all, the aim of the paper; to render the above statements comprehensible. It
is the assumption of this work that this can be done by attaching it to the case of Dora,
and by attempting to find Lacan’s place among the broad-spectrum of theories of
therapeutic action.
Discussion
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In this final chapter the research question will be answered through an elaboration
of Lacan’s therapeutic action. The importance of working in the symbolic order will be
explained regarding interpretation, the clinical relationship, and the position of the
analyst. Lacan’s “return to Freud”, as well as important differences from Freud will be
noted. Concepts will be elaborated further and the four discourses will be introduced.
For example, both desire as a question and desire of the analyst will be further explored.
Particular attention will be paid to fantasy and the unconscious structure of desire as the
object of study in Lacanian psychoanalysis.
Rationale for Choice of Case
Lacanian theory is infamous for its complexity and technical terminology. Some
have gone so far as to discredit Lacan as a charlatan who purposely obfuscated his ideas
(Fink, 1997). Therefore it is important to apply this terminology to something concrete.
The case of Dora is a worthy choice for a few reasons. First, it is a well-known case and
Lacan’s unique reading distinguishes him from other theorists. Secondly, the case is an
acknowledged failure and lends itself to reimagining. Third, Lacan wrote a very clear
critique of the case fairly early in his career. Each of these details make the choice of the
Dora case relevant. Through the use of the case of Dora Lacan’s development of the
symbolic order can be traced. Further, his “return to Freud” as well as his distinction
from contemporary theory can be shown. Since some familiarity with the case is
necessary to follow the development of this project a case summary is presented below.
Case Summary
Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (to be subsequently referred to as
“Dora”) was written in 1901 but only published four years later in 1905 (Freud, 1963).

6

Freud’s aim was to confirm his psychosexual theory of hysteria as well as to show the
clinical value of the interpretation of dreams. Since Dora cut off treatment before being
cured the treatment was considered a failure. Freud made use of this failure to recognize
and elevate the importance of transference interpretation.
Dora consists of five parts: prefatory remarks, an illustration of the clinical
picture, analysis of the first dream, analysis of the second dream, and a postscript. A
fairly comprehensive summary of Dora will be followed by some comments on the
context of the case.
Prefatory Remarks
In the prefatory remarks Freud begins on the defensive, anticipating the
“judgment of the world” (Freud, 1963, p. 1). He explains that if his theory that “the
causes of hysterical disorders are to be found in the intimacies of the patient’s
psychosexual life”, then he has no choice but to approach the matter with disarming
frankness- “even with a young woman” (Freud, 1963, p. 2). As a means of justification
Freud compares his role to that of a gynecologist.
Aside from having to deal with social restrictions Freud also explains he had
many technical difficulties. He made no use of process notes and the treatment broke off
after only three months. However, he acknowledges it was difficult enough trying to
recollect and present a short treatment and he may not have been able to do so had it been
longer. For material emerges “piecemeal” and “over widely separate periods of time”
(Freud, 1963, p. 6). The case is a “fragment” and Freud here compares himself to a
“conscientious archaeologist” who must piece together ancient relics while also adding
his own “restorative” speculations (Freud, 1963, p. 7).
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Freud explains that he has not commented upon the technique used, thus we are
presented with the results and not the process. Still, he makes a few comments in this
section, and still others later, which shed light on the therapeutic process. To begin, he
states that since his first studies on hysteria conducted with Breuer “the psychoanalytic
technique has been completely revolutionized” (Freud, 1963, p. 6). He has abandoned
the technique of clearing up symptoms one after the other, because he now understands
the “finer structure” of neurosis. Treatment begins with the patient choosing the topic;
this means treatment takes longer but promises a more thorough cure (Freud, 1963, p. 7).
The Clinical Picture
In this section Freud discusses the presenting problem and family history, but first
he makes some important comments on technique. He states, “I begin the treatment,
indeed by asking the patient to give me the whole story of his (sic) life and illness”
(Freud, 1963, p. 10). Thus, he does not rely upon the report of family members, in this
case Dora’s father, but begins with the patient’s account. He deems himself a
“translator” of the manifest to latent, as well as an “investigator” and he quotes Goethe in
extolling the virtue of patience, a “sympathetic spirit of inquiry”, and advises against an
“attitude of superiority and contempt”. This would strike some of Freud’s critics as
ironic considering how he went on to handle the treatment.
Freud emphasizes his role as investigator as he introduces two kinds of
“disingeniousness”, conscious and unconscious. This, along with amnesia, leads to doubt
and falsification of memories. Thus Freud lays specific emphasis on memory. Indeed he
states that the aim of the treatment is to “remove all possible symptoms and to replace
them by conscious thoughts”; and secondarily, to “repair all damages to the patient’s
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memory” so that their story may be “intelligible, consistent, and unbroken” (Freud, 1963,
p. 11).
Freud next turns his attention to the family. The mother is dismissed as having
“housewife psychosis” and is never a principle actor in the case. It is the father who
occupies the central place. It was he who “handed her over to [Freud] for psychoanalytic
treatment” (Freud, 1963, p. 12). Freud explains that Dora is precocious and predisposed
to neurosis due to Dora’s identification with her father, who suffered many illnesses, a
possible hysteric himself. Dora also had a brother, but he was not much involved; when
family disputes took place he would side with the mother and Dora with her father. Here
Freud makes, perhaps, a decisive step when he called this Oedipal configuration “the
usual sexual attraction” (1963, p.14).
Dora’s symptoms, beginning from age 8, are listed. These included coughing,
breathlessness, loss of voice, and catarrh. The usual treatments of the day, including
hydrotherapy and the local application of electricity, had not worked. Thus Freud notes,
forebodingly, that she had little regard for doctors. Despite this, Freud describes her
favorably as “a mature young woman of very independent judgment” and “in the first
bloom of youth- a girl of intelligent and engaging looks” (1963, p. 16).
However, something was happening that caused her to be in low spirits, Freud
had no way yet of knowing, and she went as far as to write a suicide note. Further, Dora
made the demand that they should cease their relations with the K’s. This is what brought
her father to “hand her over” to Freud with the demand to “bring her to reason” (1963, p.
20). Ostensibly, Dora’s family had simply become close to the K’s. Dora took care of
their children and behaved as “almost a mother to them”, while Dora’s father had
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increasingly began spending time with Frau K. He explained to Freud, “I am bound to
Frau K by ties of honorable friendship” (Freud, 1963, p. 19).
As it turns out the two families were involved in an illicit partnership. Dora’s
father had begun an affair with Frau K. Dora’s mother was, as she is in the case study,
absent. Herr K thus, made a proposal to Dora. Dora refused him with a slap in the face
and told her parents. Herr K threw suspicion back on the girl, saying his wife- until this
point Dora’s close friend- had told him that Dora was obsessed with sexual matters. In
the end no one believed her, her father chose Frau K over Dora’s demand, and Dora was
brought to Freud. Freud initially took a position of neutrality, suspending his judgment,
but in the end he sided with Dora’s account.
Freud remarks that Herr K’s proposal to Dora provides the necessary cause for his
and Breuer’s original trauma theory. Freud says he has gone beyond this- not abandoned
it (as he points out in a footnote)- focusing instead on the complex psychological process
of the formation of symptoms (1963, p. 20). Freud mentions an earlier trauma that she
shared and took place years before when Herr K grabbed and kissed her forcefully.
Freud shares his technique, “I questioned the patient very cautiously, careful not to
suggest or introduce language” (1963, p. 24). Yet, he also found it necessary to use his
own interpolations to fill the gaps of her story. For instance, imagining that she felt Herr
K’s “erect member”. In Freud’s opinion a “healthy girl” should have been excited, but
instead she was disgusted. He suspects a “reversal of affect” and displacement of
“sensation”, which account for her hysterical symptoms. Further utilizing his personal
opinion, he shares Freud found Herr K “still quite young and of prepossessing
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appearance” (1963, p. 22) and even excuses Herr K’s behavior, which he found “neither
tactless nor offensive” (1963, p.31).
Freud expresses some approval of Dora’s “sharp-sightedness”. She recognized
that Frau K did not “save” her father from suicide in the woods, as her family believes;
rather, they had been caught in a rendezvous and concocted a story. Dora expressed her
animosity toward Herr K and Dora’s father. Freud concurred, “the two men avoided
drawing any conclusion that would have been awkward for his own plans” (1963, p. 28).
And, “I could not in general dispute Dora’s characterization of her father” (1963, p. 27).
Freud does not act on behalf of Dora, or suggest that she, confront the adults and
bring an end to this deception. He acknowledges that if her father chose her over Frau K,
she would perhaps be cured; however, this would only reinforce her motive toward
illness. He then explains secondary gains of illness often keep them in place. Often
friends or family might try to persuade a person to change, through encouragement or
abuse, but it takes the “roundabout methods of analysis to convince the patient herself of
the existence of her intention to be ill” (Freud, 1963, p. 38).
Further, he questions Dora about the role she has played to help the affair
continue so long. After all, Dora has been careful to occupy Frau K’s children when she
knew she was alone with her father. Dora associates it to a story of a governess who
pretended to care for her, but it became evident, only when her father was around. Freud
interprets that Dora learned through the governess’s complaints of the affair, but also
implies that Dora did the same thing for Frau K’s children. Here again Freud stubbornly
insists that in fact Dora loves Herr K. She “resists”.
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Dora, “with a wearisome monotony”, returns to her anger about the affair. Freud
questions Dora’s use of “man of means” in describing her father, the opposite if which in
German, means “impotent”. Dora shares that she knows there are other ways of
gratifying a partner. Freud asks here, as elsewhere, about her source of knowledge.
Dora claims to “forget”. Freud takes the time here to once again defend his frankness, as
well to point out that everyone transgresses “normal sexuality” (1963, p. 43). Perhaps
this critique of bourgeois sexuality helps bring to light why Freud was so insistent that
Dora could enjoy Herr K’s advance. He meant to show that women enjoy sex and that
children are not as “innocent” as people would like to pretend.
The uncovering of “innocence” expresses Freud’s interpretation of Dora’s
incessant repetition of the same thoughts. He proposes that “supervalent” thoughts are
connected to the unconscious and “cannot be resolved by thought” (Freud, 1963, p. 47).
He suggests another thought is concealed; “one thought is exaggeratedly conscious while
its counterpart is repressed and unconscious” (Freud, 1963, p. 48).
Freud put forward that her preoccupation with the affair had her acting “like a
jealous wife” (1963, p. 48); both putting herself in her mother’s place and identifying
with Frau K. Freud once again introduces the Oedipal theme, remembering that she used
to care for her ill father until Frau K appeared on the scene. However, as everything
seems to be coming to a neat conclusion Freud regretfully admits to some material he
was unable to fit in his schematic. “In the world of reality” he explains, “a complication
of motives, an accumulation and conjunction of mental activities- in a word,
overdetermination- is the rule” (Freud, 1963, p. 52).
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Freud is talking about Dora’s “current of homosexuality”. He now points out
their deep intimacy. They shared the same bed, Dora was Frau K’s confidant, they
explored the encyclopedia of sex together, and Dora praised Frau K’s “adorable white
body”. Freud did not give up his belief that Dora loved Herr K, but admitted that her
love for Frau K was even more deeply unconscious. And though she had been betrayed
by her father, Frau K too had “sacrificed her without a moment’s hesitation” as well
(Freud, 1963, p. 55). Freud accounts for Dora’s amnesia regarding her “forbidden
knowledge” and jealousy concerning the affair by putting forward the hypothesis that she
loves Frau K. (1963, p. 55). This was evidently a late realization as it does not appear in
his dream interpretation, but does receive more attention in the postscript.
The First Dream: “A House Was on Fire”
“A house was on fire. My father was standing beside my bed and woke me up. I
dressed myself quickly. Mother wanted to stop and save her jewel-case; but Father said:
‘I refuse to let myself and my two children be burnt for the sake of your jewel-case.’ We
hurried downstairs, and as soon as I was outside I woke up” (Freud, 1963, p. 56).
Though Freud did not discuss the process there are two technical aspects
discussed at the beginning of this section. It appears Dora was able to associate very
productively and make use of Freud’s interpretations without much difficulty. When she
did express hesitation because something didn’t make sense, Freud simply encouraged
her and she continued. Also, Freud paid close attention to the exact words Dora used,
especially “switch-words”. These are ambiguous words, which he felt acted “like points
at a junction” connecting a link between the conscious and unconscious (Freud, 1963, p.
57).
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Freud explains that dreams are the expression of infantile, psychosexual wishes.
Many of his interpretations attempt to establish this connection. For instance, the “jewelcase” is shown to represent the female genitals. To which Dora replies, “I knew you
would say that” (Freud, 1963, p. 62). Freud reintroduces the Oedipal interpretation, but
suggests that her love for her father is a regression, avoiding her desire for Herr K. He
comes to this desire by turning a representation to its opposite. She is not afraid of Herr
K, rather she is afraid of her willingness to yield to him. Notice not much is said about
the mother. Dora, like her mother, did suffer from “catarrh”, or vaginal discharge. Her
father did have syphilis, perhaps part of the reason for the mother’s excessive cleaning
(fear of contamination). Freud interprets the ‘fire’ as concealing the opposite, the
disgusting wetness evidenced in her childhood masturbation and bed-wetting, and the
aforementioned discharge. The theme of escape also represents a childish wish for her
father’s protection, when in fact he is the one putting her in danger. Freud recognizes
later, and too late, that therapy itself had made her feel threatened and the dream
predicted her early exit from treatment (1963).
To reach his conclusions Freud had to advance many of his speculations on his
own- “Dora would not follow me” (1963, p. 63). In an effort to make the necessary
connection to childhood he explored bedwetting (which he related to her childhood
masturbation). Some of the conjectures seem far-fetched, particularly as he tries to point
out his friend Fleiss’ treatment of applying cocaine to the “gastric spot” of the nose to
curb masturbation. Freud here is collecting information to fill in gaps of his theory, and
supplementing it, almost as if he were associating for her. He explains he would not have
had to do this had she not broken treatment off early.
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The Second Dream: “I Was Walking About in a Town”
“I was walking about a town which I did not know. I saw streets and squares
which were strange to me. Then I came to a house where I lived, went to my room, and
found a letter from Mother lying there. She wrote saying that as I had left home without
my parents’ knowledge she had not wished to write to me to say that Father was ill. ‘Now
he is dead and if you like you can come.’ I then went to the station[‘Banhof’] and asked
about a hundred times: ‘Where is the station?’ I always got the answer: ‘Five minutes.’ I
then saw a thick wood before me which I went into, and there I asked a man whom I met.
He said to me: ‘Two and a half hours more.’ He offered to accompany me, but I refused
and went alone. I saw the station in front of me and could not reach it. At the same time
I had the usual feeling of anxiety that one has in dreams, when one cannot move forward.
Then I was at home. I must have been travelling in the meantime, but I know nothing
about that. I walked into the porter’s lodge, and inquired for our flat. The maidservant
opened the door and replied that Mother and the others were already at the cemetery
[‘Friedhof’]” (Freud, 1963, p. 85-86).
Freud announced that this dream could not “be made as intelligible as the first”,
but it “afforded a desirable confirmation of an assumption” (1963, p. 85). He has also got
Dora questioning her motives, as she asked why hadn’t she told her parents about Herr
K’s proposal right away, and what was it that made her suddenly tell her parents.
The associations showed Dora identifying with a young suitor (in fact, the man
she would later marry); that is she identified as a man in the dream. She remembered the
strange city as Dresden where she had visited an art gallery and gazed in rapture for two
hours at the Sistine Madonna. The “hof’s” Freud took to be clever puns regarding
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medical terms she learned with Frau K (the big book of the dream). Here Freud says,
“suspicion became certainty” (1963, p. 91). Freud saw not simply curiosity about sex,
but as a “phantasy of defloration, the phantasy of a man seeking to force an entrance into
the female genitals” (1963, p. 91). After once more insisting that Dora loved Herr K, he
reports: “Dora disputed the fact no longer” (Freud, 1963, p. 95). Freud felt quite
satisfied, yet Dora responded drolly, “Why? Has anything so very remarkable come out”
(Freud, 1963, p. 96)? Interestingly on this very page, only in a footnote, Freud
acknowledges “Dora’s deep-rooted homosexual love for Frau K (1963, p. 96n).
After the dream interpretation Dora announced that she would be leaving. Freud
finds that she had decided a fortnight prior, like a maidservant or governess. These
persons had figured in the dream and Dora’s associations. His interpretation led Dora to
recount a story of an as yet unmentioned governess. She, like Dora, had been seduced by
Herr K. She told her parents, but rather than returning home as they had asked she
waited in hope Herr K would return to her.
Freud finally found what he had been looking for; this was why Dora had waited
so long in telling her parents. Further, and perhaps more importantly, Dora heard from
this governess that he had told her, “I get nothing out of my wife,” and he used the same
line with Dora. She recognized it and slapped him. Not because she was offended by his
proposal, says Freud, but because it wounded her pride to be treated like this
maidservant. Now she was treating Freud like one. Even at the very end Freud made one
last assertion that she hoped to marry Herr K, and suggested it was not so “impracticable”
(1963, p. 99).
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Freud felt her departure was an act of “vengeance”, saying he had been “scathed”
(1963, p. 100). He then considered what else he might have done. He rejected
“exaggerating” her importance, “acting a part”, or giving “warm personal interest” to
“provide a substitute” for what she longed for (1963, p. 101). Freud views his limits as a
sign of respect, and warns against trying too hard to help. He considers Herr K, would
each of them have been successful if they had just pushed harder? He reflects that a main
feature of neurotics is the “incapacity for meeting a real erotic demand” (1963, p. 101).
In the end he settled on two mistakes: the transference and the homosexual love of Frau
K., each of which he discusses in the postscript.
Postscript
Freud first revisits his apologies for the incompleteness of the text and reaffirms
the importance of sexuality in the development of psychoneuroses; however it is the issue
of transference that takes priority. Freud explains that transferences are “new editions or
facsimiles of the tendencies or phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during
the process of the analysis” and “they replace some earlier person with the person of the
analyst” (Freud, 1963, p. 106). And again: “A whole series of psychological experiences
are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at
the present moment” (Freud, 1963, p. 106).
Clinical practice shows, he says, “transference is an inevitable necessity” and
though “it is the hardest part of the whole task… there is no means of avoiding it” (Freud,
1963, p. 107). Transference interpretation is more difficult than dream interpretation
because it must be found without help from the patient. Still it must be interpreted
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because it is through the resolution of transference that a sense of assurance concerning
the power of the treatment is finally realized (Freud, 1963).
Freud locates the “great defect” of the treatment in the fact that he “did not
succeed in mastering the transference in good time” (1963, p. 108). He reviews how she
transferred feeling of her father and Herr K onto him, particularly in the second dream,
and suggests interpreting this would have led to important associations and insights. It is
her transference of Herr K onto him that concerns Freud most. Her desire for revenge
caused her to terminate prematurely, thus she “acted out” rather than remembered.
Finally Freud, once again in a footnote, acknowledges the significance of Frau K.
He explains that he was too late in understanding and explaining that Dora’s
“homosexual love for Frau K was the strongest unconscious current in her mental life”
(1963, p. 110n). Frau K. answered another of Freud’s riddles: the source of Dora’s
sexual knowledge. He found that this repression was itself a reversal of her desire for
revenge. The revenge conceals love, Freud is surprised at “the magnanimity with which
she forgave the treachery of the friend she loved” (1963, p. 110n). He concludes the note
that, “Before I had learnt the importance of the homosexual current of feelings in
psychoneurotics, I was often brought to a standstill in the treatment of my cases or found
my in complete perplexity” (Freud, 1963, p. 110n).
This is not the end, because Dora reappeared. She paid a visit to Freud and
informed him that she had confronted the K’s; Frau K about the affair and Herr K about
his proposal. They admitted everything and she was vindicated. Even more surprising
one day she spotted Herr K in the street, he stared at her and was knocked down by a cart
in the street. In any case, she was much improved, was absorbed in work and had no
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interest in marrying. Freud did not take her back into treatment, believing she was not
sincere, and saying, “I do not know what kind of help she wanted from me” (1963, p.
112). Freud ends by announcing, now a few years after that visit, he heard she had
married recently, thus escaping her father and “reclaimed once more by the realities of
life” (1963, p. 112).
Rationale and Bias
The goal of the paper is to understand the Lacanian perspective of therapeutic
action, which claims to operate on the “symbolic” level. In order to do that, I must first
highlight the importance of the position of the analyst in therapeutic action. I also
decided to utilize Freud’s case of Dora. This case occasions a rare opportunity because
Lacan offered a critique of the case. Lacan’s assessment is unique in that it focuses on
the difference between working on the “imaginary” or the “symbolic” level, particularly
in the transference. Since this distinction is so abstract it helps to have case material.
I feel that paying attention to the contemporary issues surrounding theories of
therapeutic action lend this project added relevance. I will apply the main themes of the
debate to Freud and Lacan.
I have chosen Freud and his case of Dora for obvious reasons. First,
psychoanalysis begins with Freud, and Dora was Freud’s first major case study and
introduced the pivotal concept of transference (Freud, 1963). Second, Lacan regarded his
own theory as a “return to Freud”, and as stated above Lacan responded to this particular
case in his own texts.
Freud’s theory is now outdated in some ways, simply due to the passage of 100
years from the time of the case. However, I feel it is worthwhile and important to revisit
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his theory as it is the touchstone for all following psychoanalytic thought. I will focus on
the period from the time of the case of Dora until his papers on technique, stopping
before he introduced his structural theory of id-ego-superego. This will provide a
necessary limit to my scope. Thus, I can focus in on Freud’s concept of therapeutic
action and the position of the analyst as explicated in his topographical model and
technical papers from 1900-1915.
I choose Lacan out of my own personal interest. However, it is also important
that Lacan is both very popular in Europe and Latin America and underrepresented in
America. “By some estimates, half the world’s practicing analysts identify as Lacanian”
(Leupnitz, 2009). It seems clear Lacan has a unique and underrepresented perspective to
offer clinical social work practice. Finally, from the beginning of considering this project
I was intrigued by what “position of the analyst” entailed; a position that starts a process
and that requires a certain discipline to maintain.
Summary
This study aims to extend the limited understanding of Lacan’s theory in clinical
social work. Though a focus on the therapeutic action of the symbolic order is far from
exhaustive it is an important first step. Lacan is underrepresented or misrepresented in
textbooks. Lacan is often considered too difficult to read and avoids easy
comprehension. However, this does not mean that his thought has nothing to offer
clinical social workers. Rather, it seems his thought offers an interesting counter to ego
psychology and object relations, while also an interesting correspondence with relational
psychoanalysis. Grounding the work in Freud’s seminal text seems appropriate, for it
connects with clinical social work’s foundation while also providing Lacan’s distinctive
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critique. The next chapter will present a literature review of contemporary accounts of
therapeutic action. As such it offers a valuable connection to current issues in the field,
as well as a valuable framework in which to clarify Freudian and Lacanian theory and
technique.

21

CHAPTER TWO
THERAPEUTIC ACTION AND THE POSITION OF THE ANALYST

This chapter will introduce the phenomena: therapeutic action and the position of
the analyst. To review, the purpose of this research project is to elucidate the concept of
the Lacanian “symbolic” and its therapeutic action. In the previous chapter it was shown
that Lacan asserts that true psychoanalytic change can only occur through working in the
symbolic. This draws attention to two features that are relevant to this chapter. The first
is obvious and the second is implied. First, therapeutic action, according to Lacan, takes
place in the symbolic. Second, the analyst’s function is effective to the extent that he or
she maintains a position that allows for work in the symbolic. Consequently, in
answering the question- “What is the therapeutic action of working in the symbolic?”- it
is necessary to examine the contemporary status of therapeutic action and to highlight the
position of the analyst.
In addition to this, the main themes that identify therapeutic action and the
position of the analyst will be identified. These indicators will be applied to Freud and
Lacan in the following chapters. This will provide a helpful framework with which the
development of the paper can be followed, held accountable, and made clear.
To begin with, the contemporary conceptualization of therapeutic action will be
introduced, which includes concerns surrounding the communication of the concept as
well as attitudes toward an empirical resolution to the question. The population includes
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psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practitioners and the scope extends back to
Strachey’s seminal text on therapeutic action. Following the historical development of
the concept, the importance of the position of the analyst will be reviewed. Themes
concerning therapeutic action and the position of the analyst will be introduced. Finally,
schematics of Kernberg and then Mitchell will be used to illustrate the key indicators of a
theory of therapeutic action.
Introducing Therapeutic Action
This section explores the contemporary conditions of therapeutic action, which
will bring two ancillary issues to the forefront: the difficulty of theorizing therapeutic
action across psychoanalytic schools, and the differing attitudes toward the promise of a
scientific resolution to this problem.
The question of communicating across schools in psychoanalytic theory will be
addressed. Gabbard and Westen (2003) acknowledge that the demise of the “standard
technique” means there is no longer a consensus about therapeutic action. It is a concept
in transition, because psychoanalytic theory itself is in transition. Pluralism has replaced
“classical” orthodoxy. There are a number of different schools (Ego Psychology,
Relational, Kleinian, Lacanian, Self Psychology) each approaching the concept in a
variety of ways (Kernberg, 2007).
Greenberg (2002) views the clarification of what is meant by therapeutic action as
a key task of contemporary psychoanalysis. Some are looking to unify psychoanalytic
theory with the hope of having a theory bolstered by empirical evidence, particularly due
to advances in cognitive neuroscience (Kernberg, 2007; Gabbard & Westen, 2003).
Others insist there can be no true communication between schools because they are
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working from different paradigms (Mitchell, 1988; Friedman, 2007). Still others find the
concept of therapeutic action itself unimportant, preferring to focus on the process of
psychoanalysis, rather than its effects, empirical or not (Aisenstein, 2007).
To review, a theory of therapeutic action, in general, is a theory of what effects
change. Outside of psychoanalysis one can consider that an herb or drug form of an
“expectorant” has the therapeutic action of promoting mucous membrane secretions.
However, unlike taking a substance, psychoanalysis is a process, so a theory of
therapeutic action in this field of study also requires an elaboration of the aims and
techniques that bring about the change. A further consideration, just as in the
administration of a drug is the diagnostic rationale for using the therapy. For example,
many practitioners view psychoanalysis as unfit for low functioning patients, or at least
as requiring significant modification of treatment goals (Kernberg, 2007). It follows
logically that different treatment goals would necessitate a different theory of therapeutic
action.
Communication Between Different Theories
In surveying the literature on the issue of communication between schools, one
finds two main themes. First, there is the problem of using different verbage, but talking
about the same thing. Secondly, there is the problem of using the same terms, but
implying vastly different meanings.
In regards to the first problem, there is the view that explanations about what has
worked in a treatment vary significantly, while what actually happened was essentially
similar (Aisenstein, 2007; Gabbard & Westen, 2003). That is, similar phenomena are just
being translated into different theoretical languages. Greenberg (2002) suggests that this
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is partly due to the fact that much of what is going on in the psychoanalytic process is
obscure. Aisenstein (2007) has an interesting view of this phenomenon; she suggests that
a practitioner may choose certain theories out of an unconscious identification or
unanalyzed transferences to those one associates with the theory (i.e. the theory’s
founder, one’s analyst or supervisor).
The second problem, that of using the same words but talking about different
phenomenon, is taken up by Mitchell (1988). He explains that current psychoanalytic
controversies are problematic because each school holds other schools to their own
standards, which from their viewpoint the other schools inevitably fail to meet. Mitchell
argues that this failure is at least partially because the fundamental premises differ. Each
proponent may be using the same words (i.e. interpretation, countertransference, etc.), but
they are in fact talking about different phenomena (Mitchell, 1988). That is because they
are operating under different paradigms. Due to this fundamental variance it is difficult
to compare theories of therapeutic action.
Smith (2007) also acknowledges that when author’s representing different schools
write about therapeutic action they are “talking past each other” (p. 1737). In his survey
of therapeutic action he not only notices, as Mitchell did, the competing positions of
schools, but a more fundamental difference. He finds theorists, in their descriptions, are
operating on different levels of abstraction. Some are talking about what analysis does,
some on what the analyst does, and others about what happens in the interaction. Smith
(2007) expresses his disapproval of “the historical trend toward conflating the theory of
therapeutic action and the theory of technique” (p. 1739).
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The last point has meaning for this project’s emphasis on the position of the
analyst. However, the dilemma can be resolved presently. This project eludes Smith’s
critique on account of the explicit acknowledgement I make of the connection between
theory and practice. The position taken in this paper is a recognition that theory is
embodied in the acts of the analyst. Finally, Smith is practically alone in this critique,
others take the interdependence of theory and technique for granted (rather than viewing
it as “conflation”) (Gabbard & Westen, 2003: Kernberg, 2007; Mitchell, 1988).
Aside from the discursive problems presented here there is the difficulty of
identifying and isolating the change agent that makes for therapeutic action. Cooper
(1989) explains that even a moment of analysis is extraordinarily complex; hence it is
unlikely that description alone will identify the change agent. It is this difficulty that
leads some to give up the search for a unified theory and accept that different approaches
all have benefits even if we cannot articulate why. This attitude perhaps best describes
the current pluralism in the field of psychoanalysis. Still, developments in neuroscience
give some reason to believe that the therapeutic action can be empirically identified.
Empirical Identification of Therapeutic Action
Of course, psychoanalysis has had a complicated relationship with science from
it’s beginning. Freud’s technique did draw on the scientific method, and he rigorously
questioned his theories in the light of clinical data. It was Freud’s hope that
psychoanalysis would one day stand on equal footing with other sciences (Gay, 1998). In
fact in one of his first works, written in 1895, The Project for a Scientific Psychology
(1950) Freud attempted to locate and verify his metapsychology through the study of
neurons. Interestingly, advances in cognitive neuroscience, some of which confirm
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psychoanalytic theory, show that Freud was on to something (Cozolino, 2002). However,
psychoanalysis is still far from empirically determining therapeutic action. As it stands
now, there is no consensus on the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis.
Michels (2007) acknowledges the fact of the methodological difficulties,
including the problem of employing control groups and the number of factors at play in
analysis (already alluded to above). In his overview of the current situation he concludes,
“We have not yet developed a strategy or a language for comparing, testing, or evaluating
[therapeutic action]” (2007, p. 1733). Kernberg (2007) acknowledges the dearth of
empirical support in contrast to the great accumulation of clinical experience. He allows
that it is easier to observe and describe than to demonstrate, but believes it will be
necessary to test hypotheses, particularly to “sort out what is specific about
psychoanalysis proper” (p. 1722).
Gabbard and Westen (2003) do not see the current pluralism in psychoanalytic
theory as evidence that empirical research cannot be done. It may be true that some
goals and techniques may be at cross-purposes, yet interventions interact in complex
ways. They believe this is an empirical question, which can be answered due to new
technological advances in neuroscience. Greenberg (2002) also notes how clinical
hypotheses are supported by recent neuroscience. He believes the task at hand is to
demonstrate and refine therapeutic action through such empirical evidence. Those who
share his belief have reason for optimism. Recent developments in neuroscience,
particularly implicit and explicit memory, have lent empirical support to basic premises
of psychoanalytic thought regarding the unconscious and the efficacy of making changes
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in associational networks (Gabbard & Westen, 2003). Whitehead (2006) proposes a
complete refiguring of therapeutic action based on empirical data.
These authors are among the most optimistic and place the empirical validation of
therapeutic action as a central concern. Of course, a practitioner’s attitude toward science
is one element of a theory of therapeutic action, but it is not one I regard as a crucial
aspect. It will not be counted among the key areas of inquiry in this investigation of
Lacan’s symbolic and therapeutic action.
This section introduced issues of concern in the contemporary field of
psychoanalysis regarding therapeutic action, specifically communication between schools
and attitudes toward a scientific resolution of the question of therapeutic action. The next
section presents the development of therapeutic action by reviewing the two most
influential articles on the subject.
Strachey and Loewald on Therapeutic Action
This section will begin with Strachey’s paper on therapeutic action and then
proceed to Loewald’s, both of which were important historical contributions in the
development of the theory of therapeutic action and in the increased focus on the
relationship rather than on “classical” interpretation. Strachey’s paper (1934), perhaps
the more important of the two, preceded Loewald’s by almost 30 years and initiated the
process of emphasizing the role of the analytic relationship. The analyst, in his view,
becomes a less harsh super-ego to be internalized by the patient. Loewald (1960) further
emphasized the internalization of the analyst and utilized a very influential “reparenting”
model, similar to the contemporaneous development of Winnicott’s “holding” or Bion’s
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“containment”. This emphasis on the reparative aspects of the relationship was far
removed from Freud’s “archeological” metaphor and emphasis on accurate interpretation.
Here the key concept of the position of the analyst will be introduced. This paper
argues that the position of the analyst is intimately connected to any theory of therapeutic
action and this is very much true of Lacan. The current state of the theory of therapeutic
action owes much to these important articles on therapeutic action by Strachey (1934)
and Loewald (1960). Both articles develop the idea of the analyst as an object.
Strachey’s paper provides a fitting transition from the last section because he
terms it an “attack” upon the lack of precision, which causes such confusion around
delineating the therapeutic effects of analysis (1934). The paper begins by reviewing the
development of Freud’s thought, moving from the interpretation of unconscious wishes to
resistance, and finally transference. He then gives his definition of a “mutative
interpretation”, which includes his view of the importance of the analyst becoming a new
object for the patient.
Calling his stance “orthodox” he proceeds to detail Freud’s papers on technique.
Freud’s first theory was developed from his work with hysterics (Verhaeghe, 1999). He
developed the tools of free association and interpretation, each working toward the goal
of making the unconscious conscious. Of course, it was found that even after successful
actions were taken the symptoms endured. Thus, “resistance analysis” was born. As
Strachey puts it, the “main task is not so much to investigate the objectionable
unconscious trend as to get rid of the patient’s resistance to it” (1934, p. 276). Next,
Strachey, following Freud, brings his attention to transference.
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The spectre of suggestion haunts psychoanalysis and the development of
therapeutic action has often been centered on an attempt at differentiating the
psychoanalytic method from suggestion, which is so reliant upon relationships
(Greenberg, 2002). This was a cause of a rift between Ferenzci and Freud. Ferenzci and
Rank (2006) acknowledged, as did Jung (McGuire, 1994), the importance of the
relationship in the psychoanalytic cure. However, in Strachey’s “classical” opinion,
positive transference is nothing but suggestion, which had been the original tool of
psychoanalysis. This is not an analytic tool for it would require unending dependence
upon the analyst (1934). Thus positive transference, and of course negative transference,
were regarded as obstacles, until it was realized that the transference itself could be
analyzed.
And this, according to Strachey, is the opportunity that psychoanalytic
transference interpretation provides: recognizing that the past “revivified” in the present
allows the patient to “choose a new solution instead of the old one” (1934, p. 277). It
may be clear to readers that Strachey’s reading of Freud is highly influenced by the
structural theory. From our vantage point we can see this ego psychological emphasis on
adaptation and conceptualization of neurosis as “a deflecting force in the path of normal
development” (1934, p. 280), which became so prevalent. This position is furthered as
Strachey presents his original development: the analyst as an auxiliary superego.
As Strachey reaches the pinnacle of his argument and introduces the term
“mutative interpretation” he also introduces the analyst as a special kind of object.
Though he does not highlight it, many to follow realized that though he was talking about
interpretation he was in fact placing a forceful emphasis on the relationship (Gabbard &
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Westen, 2003; Greenberg, 2000). A central part of the theory is that the patient uses the
analyst as a new object, hence elevating transference analysis to an essential rank.
Through the internalization of the analyst’s interpretations the patient modifies his own
harsh superego, thus modeling his own upon the more realistic, less severe “auxiliary”
superego of the analyst (Strachey, 1934).
To summarize, the first stage is an id-impulse; the libidinal transference toward a
new object, which is a new opportunity, and yet one the patient is likely to enact in old
ways (Strachey, 1934). The second stage occurs when through the conflict of fantasy and
reality (here the influence of Klein is palpable) the patient realizes the needless harshness
of their superego. However, insight is not enough. Internalization must occur. The final
point to be made is that the analyst must maintain “neutrality”, neither suggesting bad nor
good qualities so that the patient’s fantasy can take hold and finally be confronted.
Loewald (1960), in many ways similar to Strachey, advances this idea of the
importance of the new object relation. Additionally, he develops the reparenting
metaphor, and clarifies the concept of “neutrality”. More explicitly than Strachey,
Loewald views the development of a new “object relationship” as the change agent in
analysis. All hope rests in a new object relationship, though first something familiar (the
fantasy) must be provoked. Similarly to Strachey, he identifies the importance of
identification and introjection, as such he places interaction with the analyst at the center
of the process.
Loewald (1960) abandons drive theory for ego-psychology, consequently leading
to a concentration on ego-development. Here, he breaks new ground in developing the
parent-infant metaphor. Whereas, interaction as a central part of therapeutic action had
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been put forward previously, he also puts ego development at the center of the
therapeutic process. Phrases like “organization of the psychic apparatus” and “mutual
responsiveness” have obviously found fertile soil (Loewald, 1960, p. 24) through
attachment theory, for instance.
Like Strachey he emphasizes “neutrality”, but is not talking about “objectivity”
(Loewald, 1960). Neutrality might simply be described as not being pulled into the
transference, or allowing the transference to develop. In any case neutrality is the only
way that the analyst can hold himself in position to be a new object. So here, finally, the
position of the analyst comes into relief.
By way of transition to the next section let’s revisit one of Loewald’s key points:
the function of the mother is similar to the function of the analyst. This is quite different
from Strachey’s metaphor. He uses this word “function” numerous times. Reconsidering
the word “neutral” as well it is possible here to substitute “position of the analyst”.
Canestri (2007) states that, “Analytic neutrality” can be seen as, “the behavioral and
emotional position of the analyst in his or her relationship with the patient, from which
the analyst observes various features while maintaining an optimal distance” (p. 1610).
From this perspective the same can be said of Strachey’s “auxiliary superego”, this
represents a position the analyst assumes and maintains in the interest of acting as a
functionary of the therapeutic action.
Before continuing it may be helpful to make some initial comments on how this
relates to Lacan. Lacan’s theory was developed in response to authors like Strachey and
Loewald, who placed emphasis on ego development. In this reply, sometimes it might be
considered an attack, Lacan offers what he terms a “return to Freud”. In his view
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psychoanalysis had strayed and become a therapy of adaptation. Lacan, with the benefit
of structural linguistics, developed what he saw as the logical consequences of Freud’s
discoveries. Lacan’s viewpoint can best be expressed by his juxtaposition of the
imaginary and the symbolic, which will be explored below.
Position of the Analyst
To this point the paper has discussed the contemporary status of therapeutic action
and reviewed the important historical move toward the relationship as represented by
Strachey and Loewald’s seminal papers. Focus now shifts to the important task of
appending “position of the analyst” to the therapeutic action. Strachey and Loewald
offered examples of the function of the analyst, which showed a positioning, as well as a
discipline required of the analyst to hold that position. This discipline has often been
called “neutrality”. Freud (1912) introduced this position as “evenly hovering attention”.
Anna Freud (1966) updated this for structural theory by advocating the importance of
keeping one’s attention at an “equidistance” from the id, ego, and superego.
The significance of all this relies entirely upon its usefulness in helping to reach
the ultimate goal of understanding Lacan’s concept of the symbolic. Therefore, that
connection should be made presently. The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is, in the
simplest measure, to effect a change. Lacan, in the 1950s (the same period in which he
offered his critique of Freud on the case of Dora), used the model of empty and full
speech. In this case the therapeutic action is to lead the patient to “full” speech (Evans,
1996). Another way to put this is for the patient to articulate the truth of his or her desire.
This connotes a change in the subject’s position. The analyst, to lead this process, also
must “adopt a position” (Malone & Friedlander, 1999). The position the analyst adopts
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must be one that allows for “working in the symbolic”. The analyst is “the instrument
which enables the patient to make a ‘full’ statement” (Nobus, 2000, p. 66). Now this
technique can, according to Lacan, only be accomplished by doing away with “the
interferences in symbolic relations created by the imaginary” (Fink in Malone &
Friedlander, 1999, p. 163).
Any brief description of Lacan’s theory is doomed because each of his terms has a
specific place in a larger theoretical context. Nonetheless, an attempt will be made here
to give a clinical example of working in the symbolic, which will of course be expanded
upon later. The imaginary is a level at which the subject compares him or herself to all
others. The symbolic sets up a different relationship- not to “others”, but to the “Other”not an individual but a structural level.
Lander (2007) describes the aim of Lacanian techinque as insight and reliving.
This draws attention to the importance of increased self-knowledge with equal emphasis
on an emotional experience. However, as Aisenstein (2007) explains, interpretation is
not directed at cognitive understanding (as in ego psychology), rather it is about
approaching the primary process. Therefore, interpretations are not didactic or
explanatory, instead they are indirect and allusive (Aisenstein, 2007). This is because
attention is paid to the symbolic rather than the imaginary.
According to Lacan, it is in the symbolic that true change can occur (Lacan,
2006). The imaginary is the realm of images, including the self-image or the ego. This is
also the realm of identifications. Lacan is very clear that the patient identifying with the
analyst is not a goal of treatment.
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Lacan suggests that most neurotic clients will view the analyst as “the one
supposed to know”, someone who has secret knowledge of his problems. Fink (1997)
explains that the analyst need not disavow this power (in an attempt to be “authentic”),
but neither should she claim it and take up the position of the “master”. One of the goals
of treatment is the symbolization of what is traumatic (also called “the real”). However,
in the process, as one gets closer to the core, repulsion increases. This is often called
“resistance”, though Lacan views it as a natural process in the process of the
symbolization of the traumatic real (Fink, 1997). At this point the analyst can blame the
patient, or conversely, the patient might question the analyst’s ability. It is precisely here
that the analyst might be tempted to respond at the imaginary level in order to defend her
credibility. But such a response is on the level of her persona. Fink states the analyst
“need not respond as an ego” rather it is better, to continue to occupy the position of an
abstract function. In short, one must be positioned as an Other (1997, p.121).
The position of the analyst is an abstract concept, often expressed figuratively
through metaphor, which denotes how the analyst should position and maintain himself
in relation to the patient. It has consequences in regards to what the analyst’s main
responsibilities are, the how and what of interpretation, the understanding of the clinical
relationship, and how to handle the transference. The contemporary accounts of
therapeutic action can be shown to have similar metaphors of position (though these will
tend to be more relational in nature). For example, this includes that of a “container”, a
“parent-infant relationship”, or a “co-creator”. The position of the analyst corresponds to
the issues that will be discussed in the next section: interpretation and the clinical
relationship. These key aspects that demarcate the position of the analyst will later be
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applied to Freud and Lacan and will provide the motor force behind answering the
research question: What does it mean to work at the level of the symbolic and what is its
therapeutic action?
Therapeutic Action: Interpretation and Relationship
Having developed an understanding of therapeutic action and the position of the
analyst the time has come to properly introduce the framework that will be used
throughout the paper to identify therapeutic action. Briefly, the frame will be determined
by the interpretation and the clinical relationship. In this section views concerning
interpretation and the clinical relationship will be introduced, followed by a more specific
inquiry into each.
In a survey of the literature the most common conceptualization of therapeutic
action is centered on a dichotomy of interpretation and the relationship (Abend, 2009;
Aisenstein, 2007; Canestri, 2007; Fonagy, 1999; Gabbard and Westen, 2003; Greenberg,
2002; Kernberg, 2007; Mitchell and Black, 1996; Smith, 2007 ). Historically,
interpretation was considered the only tool available to the clinician (Greenberg, 2002;
Mitchell, 1988). The curative factors of the relationship were downplayed due to
discomfort about the unfounded nature of suggestion. While suggestion may lead to a
therapeutic cure, it cannot be considered a properly analytic cure. Eventually, as seen in
Strachey (1934) and Loewald (1960) as well as the development of relational
psychoanalysis, the relationship became increasingly valued as a change agent (Abend,
2009; Greenberg, 2002; Mitchell & Black, 1996).
Recently, some authors have proposed that the opposition of the relationship and
interpretation is no longer tenable (Gabbard & Westen, 2002; Pine, 1998).
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Gabbard and Westen (2003) propose that the interpretation versus relationship
debate has been diminished by the continual plurality of psychoanalytic approaches.
They suggest that research, such as the Menninger Research Project, show that
independent of a clinician’s approach therapeutic effects were found. Further, elements
of each approach work “synergistically” (Gabbard & Westen, 2003). Greenberg (2002)
proposed as much when he noted that the declarative unconscious seemed connected to
memories and interpretation, while research in procedural unconscious suggest nonverbal, relational modes of therapy are most effective. In the section on therapeutic
action and science it was shown that far too much is happening at any moment in the
mind in therapy to understand precisely what is happening.
Still, as Kernberg (2007) shows the pitting of interpretation against relationship as
the fundamental mover of therapeutic action remains to this day. It can be said that while
the clinical relationship and interpretation might not be mutually exclusive they are
jointly exhaustive in accounting for therapeutic action. Thus authors tend to still organize
theories as though along a continuum (Abend, 2009; Canestri, 2007; Greenberg, 2002;
Kernberg, 2007).
Historically, interpretation was long regarded as the exclusive method of
psychoanalytic therapeutic action. Slowly, clinicians began to assert there was
“something more” gong on and many now emphasize the relationship as the true
therapeutic factor (Greenberg, 2002). Lear (2000) expresses caution to all those who find
Freud foolish and obsolete and believe that all is now figured out. Don’t mistake change
for progress, the same limitations of context and understanding affect us today. In this
project the position is taken that clearly the relationship and interpretation are abstract
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concepts that are not neatly distinguished; however, they are also the most commonly
employed concepts with which to assess a particular theory of therapy action and so are
best suited for the purposes of understanding the therapeutic action of working in the
symbolic, according to Lacan.
Interpretation and Therapeutic Action
Kernberg (2007) reviews eight papers presented in a recent issue of
Psychoanalytic Quarterly dedicated entirely to a discussion of therapeutic action. The
authors represent a full range of contemporary psychoanalytic thought, including:
Kleinian, Ego Psychology, Self Psychology, Relational, and Lacanian. Kernberg finds
four themes: a continuum of interpretation versus relationship, modification of
intervention in response to varying psychopathology, the effect of therapeutic orientation
on technique, and the use of countertransference (Kernberg, 2007). For the purposes of
this paper I will use his appraisal to begin a discussion of the Interpretation-Relationship
continuum and to describe mutative interpretations.
Below (Table 1) presents the continuum, with those schools more focused upon
interpretation at the top and those more focused upon the relationship at the bottom.
Also, next to each school is provided a brief summary of each school’s view of a
mutative interpretation. For the remainder of this section I will elaborate on this chart.
Summaries such as these are inevitably reductionist and it is likely that none of the
schools would be happy with how they are represented here. Nonetheless, schematic
illustrations such as this one can be very helpful.
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Table 1:
Interpretation Continuum
School
Interpretation

Lacanian

Interpretation
Enigmatic interpretation of deep unconscious meanings;
insight beyond cognitive, includes emotional and primary
process

Kleinian

Transference interpretation; focus on here and now,
destructiveness; insight into unconscious fantasy

Relationship

Ego

Transference interpretation; surface level interpretations;

Psychology

resolution of pathological defensive systems

Self

Focus on developmental needs; provisions of a corrective

Psychology

emotional experience

Relational

Development of a new relationship with the analyst; Use of
countertransference in interpretation

Kernberg (2007) places Lacanian theory at the far end of the InterpretationRelationship continuum. The Lacanian approach employs “deep” interpretation and
makes very little use of the “real” relationship. The aim of interpretation is insight and
reliving (Lander, 2007). However, the interpretation is not directed at a cognitive level.
Rather, it has an “associative and allusive character that would appeal to the primary
process beyond the patient’s cognitive grasp” (Kernberg, p. 1698). This separates
Lacanian interpretation from Kleinian and Ego Psychological interpretation, though the
latter emphasize insight. A further separation is that transference should not be
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interpreted (Aisenstein, 2007); focus is on the analytic function and not the person of the
analyst.
Kleinian interpretation appears next on the continuum. The aim, again, is
interpretation that leads to insight. Eizirik (2007) explains that Kleinian interpretation is
directed to the here and now. The task is to “give a precise and timely interpretation of
what the patient is doing to the analyst” (Canestri, 2007, p. 1608). There is a unique
focus on a systematic interpretation of the transference and countertransference, for
example destructiveness. The insight into roles enacted in the transference helps distill
reality from fantasy (Hinshelwood, 2007). Unlike relational approach, though Kleinians
use countertransference, they are generally against disclosure.
Ego Psychology also views interpretation as leading to insight. However, the
level of interpretation works at a more surface level than Lacanian interpretation
(Kernberg, 2007). The aim is to focus on the ego and help establish new, more adaptive
defenses. Abend (2007) acknowledges the influence of the Kleinian focus on the preoedipal and use of countertransference, but maintains a focus on aggressive and sexual
conflicts, including of course those that occur in the transference.
Self-psychology is the first theory mentioned thus far that interprets from within
the relational matrix (Kernberg, 2007). The analyst becomes the object that the patient
needs, an idealized selfobject. The analyst makes interpretations, but the content is less
important than the provision of “mirroring” and “empathetic holding”. Interpretations
give an implicit “responsiveness” and “legitimization” that the patient needs. Differing
from Klein, frustration is attributed exclusively to the environment and not to a primary
destructiveness. The empathetic surround, or containment, sets the stage for incremental,
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optimal frustration. Though there are obvious differences, there is one similarity here
with Lacanian interpretation: an internalization of the analyst’s function (Eizirik, 2007).
The relational approach also makes interpretations from within the relational
matrix. There is a focus on the here and now to a degree even more than selfpsychology, and this necessitates spontaneity, which may include the analyst’s subjective
response. The focus is on “the characters the patient has created to represent his or her
experience” (Kernberg, 2007, p. 1715). The analyst has the flexibility and partakes of the
freedom to share his or her own reactions in the analysis of what is happening in the
clinical relationship.
Summary of Interpretation
Strachey (1934) introduced the concept of “mutative” interpretation; however,
this has obviously expanded in the current pluralistic era of psychoanalysis. Friedman
(2007) has even considered something as general as the “provision of new perspectives”a far cry from the accurate explanation of symptoms and psychic conflict. Fonagy (1999)
also suggests that the reconstruction of memory is outdated and that interpretation is only
useful if directed to the here and now.
The above shows some of the key aspects of what is considered the therapeutic
action of interpretation. This includes the aim of interpretation and the quality of the
interpretation. First, the interpretation is supposed to do something. For example,
interpretation may encourage free association or it may provide a support. Typically the
goal is insight, which of course can mean many things. Interpretation might be aimed at
producing insight into wishes, fear, fantasies, defenses, conflicts, transference, relational
patterns, or countertransference (Gabbard & Westen, 2003). Secondly, a “good”
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interpretation has certain qualities. For example, it is supposed to be accurate, or perhaps
empathetic. Also it is supposed to emphasize a period of time, either the here and now or
reconstruction of memory. For example, the analyst provides interpretation that is at a
certain level of insight: “deep” as opposed to explicitly aimed at the cognitive or adaptive
level. Finally, there is the position of the analyst. As I have stated, this comprises the
function of the analyst in facilitating the therapeutic action. In regards to interpretation,
this includes the relative importance of transference and the use of countertransference.
Mitchell’s Three Models and the Clinical Relationship
Earlier it was noted that Mitchell (1988) acknowledged the difficulty of
discussing therapeutic action between schools. Perhaps, Mitchell aims to help bridge this
divide as he presents what he believes are the three dominant models of psychoanalysis:
the drive-conflict model, the developmental-arrest model, and the relational model
(Mitchell, 1988). Once again a table (Table 2) will be utilized to illustrate the topic.
Mitchell looks at the history and premises of each model. Interpretation will be briefly
noted before moving on to the primary focus of this section: the conceptualization of the
clinical relationship.
In Mitchell’s summary he points out that the drive-conflict model developed out
of hypnotism and is grounded in drive theory. The aim is to uncover the hidden infantile
wishes and the main tool is the interpretation of free associations. Mitchell points out
Freud’s use of zoological and military metaphors, as the work is described as a “battle”
against resistances to uncover “bestial” id drives (Mitchell, 1988). Moving to the
developmental-arrest model Mitchell describes a shift to the pre-oedipal relations of the
child, which predate the formation of the drives. The metaphor used here is the mother-
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infant relationship. Once again interpretation is the primary tool of analysis, but accuracy
is less important than the implicit communication of empathy and care. It is through
regression and “holding” that the patient’s natural development can “reassert itself
spontaneously” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 286), and thus reconnects with a true self that had
been lost due to environmental deficits. Here are echoes of the position of the analyst as
presented by Strachey and Loewald. The relational model also places emphasis upon
early relational experiences, but not as a developmental need that should be liberated.
Rather, the focus is on the relational world of the patient as manifest in the analytic
relationship. With the background of the three models now introduced focus can be
placed on the clinical relationship presented in each model.
Table 2
The Clinical Relationship
Model

Clinical Relationship

Use of transference and
countertransference

Drive-conflict

Developmental

Relational

Archaeologist; analyst as a

Focused on infantile wishes

function; help to gain

and conflict; must not “play

insight

the game”

Parent-infant; analyst as

Focused on developmental

object to be internalized;

needs; utilize transference for

help to get back on track

information, but no disclosure

Here and now; co-creator;

Focus on current clinical

help to find a new way of

relationship; counter-

relating

transference and disclosure
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According to the relational model, due to early object relations the patient’s selforganization is patterned on established pathways of connecting to others. These habits
come out in the process of therapy. In a move that clearly emphasizes the relationship
over interpretation, it is the interaction within the analytic relationship that is mutative.
The analyst plays a crucial role by “discovering himself within the structures and
strictures of the repetitive configurations of the analysand’s relational matrix” (Mitchell,
1988, p. 292). Opposed to the drive-conflict model the analyst must “play the game”.
Therefore transference and countertransference are constantly in use. The
developmental-arrest model focuses on past, and places the analyst as facilitator,
believing relational patterns manifest independent of therapist. Both the drive-conflict
model and the developmental-arrest model would see such participation as intrusive and
needlessly involving the self in the process. The relational model is a collaboration, with
a focus on the here and now and a two person model.
Here it is important to pause and consider the position of the analyst as presented
by the first two models in order to recognize the radical shift represented by the relational
model. In both the drive-conflict model and the developmental-arrest model the analyst
works from outside, whereas in the relational model the analyst works from the inside.
In the drive-conflict model the analyst’s demeanor is objective and detached. The
analyst is present as function, to frustrate and spur insight, but not as a relating person
(Mitchell, 1988, p. 283). Transference is regarded as resistance; therefore “not joining in
the game is the principal task” (Fenichel in Mitchell, 1988 p. 284). Countertransference
is not considered useful. The analyst’s attention is toward the past and hidden conflict,
helping the patient renounce his infantile wishes.
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In the developmental-arrest model focus is not upon renunciation, but the
“provision of maternal functions” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 288). The analyst will offer an
environment in which the patient feels safe to regress and to re-experience. There is
much more focus on affect. The analyst will be prepared to bear whatever transference
the analyst throws at her with empathy. This offers a new experience. Again, according
to Mitchell, both of these approaches have the analyst work from outside the patient’s
“relational matrix” (Mitchell, 1988). In contrast, the relational model has the analyst
working within the relational matrix.
Summary of Clinical Relationship and Therapeutic Action
The above helps to establish, as illustrated in three different models, the key
aspects of the clinical relationship as it relates to therapeutic action. As can be seen
above there is much to consider in just how the analyst interacts with the patient. One
way to understand it is to see the relationship as utilizing natural processes, while also
interrupting those processes.
The relationship is a different kind of relationship; some view this in itself as
mutative. For example, Loewald and Winnicott believe in the natural ability of the
patient to get back on track once their developmental needs are met. Still there is an
aspect of interfering with the normal construction of meaning, particularly since this may
be symptomatic. Friedman (2007) sees this as a “deconstruction of desire”, which is
particularly evocative of Lacan. In any case, the therapist takes up a position in the
relationship. Generally, some see the mutative factors as an internalization of the analyst
or identification of relational patterns. These privilege the relationship over
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interpretation, though once again it is difficult to separate interpretation and relationship
in such a process.
Summary
In summary, the therapeutic action of the interpretation has been described as
including the aim of the interpretation, the qualities of the interpretation, and how the
interpretation establishes the position of the analyst. The therapeutic action of the clinical
relationship can be understood through the conceptualization of the therapeutic frame, the
description of the clinical relationship (particularly in metaphor), and the use of
transference and countertransference. These specific indicators of a theory of therapeutic
action will work as the method by which Freud and then Lacan’s theory of therapeutic
action will be identified.
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CHAPTER THREE
FREUD AND THE CASE OF DORA

This chapter will explore Freud’s theory of therapeutic action as evidenced in the
case of Dora. A summary of the case has been given in the Chapter One. The
examination of therapeutic action here will follow the outline set forth in Chapter Two.
To begin, Freud’s theory of therapeutic action will be stated. Then the key components
of a theory of therapeutic action will be explored. In order to make things easier,
reference will be mainly restricted to the following elements of the case: Dora’s
complicity in the affair, the scene by the lake in which Dora slaps Herr K., Dora’s
relationship with Frau K., and the transference. The grounds for this decision can be
justified in that those elements of the case chosen and those left out are in accord with
Lacan’s interest, and as such offer the surest path toward answering the research
question. The chapter will conclude with a survey of critiques of Freud’s case study.
This will help to set the stage for Lacan’s critique of the case, which will be explored in
depth in Chapter Four.
Freud’s Therapeutic Action
Freud’s theory of therapeutic action is, simply stated, to make the unconscious
conscious through the employment of free association and interpretation. Key to Freud’s
theory of therapeutic action are the concepts of “splitting” and “displacement”. The
understanding, reached through his early clinical experience with hysterics, was that
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dissociation occurred because of the emergence of a representation antithetical to the ego.
In hysteria, the affect of the repressed representation was then converted to a physical
symptom. For example, Dora’s desire for Herr K., which Dora’s ego would not admit to
consciousness, was expressed by the appearance of aphonia in his absence. Thus, the
goal was to associate, to recombine the split, and recover through abreaction, or catharsis.
That which had disappeared can now return to conscious associative activity (Freud,
1950). This is the aim.
Freud’s “revolutionary” approach was that, unlike Charcot, and most other
scientific methods dealing with hysterics, Freud employed an artful technique of listening
that implies a very different sense of therapeutic action. The symptoms, like dreams, are
saying something. Along with encouraging the patient to speak and remember (and so
abreact), the technique includes a careful listening to how the patient makes sense of their
suffering. However, because of the split of conscious and unconscious, the analyst
cannot take the words at face value, but must listen carefully and find the false
connection. In the case of the hysteric’s physical symptoms the analyst must read these
displacements as displacements of a psychosexual desire.
Hysteria dates back to at least 2000 B.C. when in Ancient Egypt it was
recommended that the wandering uterus be treated by marriage. Plato’s teleological
explanation was that the uterus longs for children. When it is barren it becomes disturbed
and begins wandering throughout the body and causes physical symptoms, such as
difficulty breathing (Verhaeghe, 1999). While this may sound peculiar, there were still
other cruel treatments, including hydrotherapy and electrotherapy (treatments that Dora
had already tried before coming to Freud) (Decker, 1991).
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As Freud engaged in the talking cure he noticed the great difficulty of separating
fact from fiction, trauma and fantasy. He found not seduction, but erotic impulses to be
the rule. So his investigation turned not to a mysterious trauma, but to an inarticulable
desire. At the time of Dora, Freud had shown how desire was split from consciousness
and displaced, only to return in dreams, slips of tongue and mistakes, and in jokes (The
Interpretation of Dreams, 1900; The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 1901; Jokes and
their Relation to the Unconscious, 1905). With the hysteric it was found that the
symptoms were directed to another person and were related to identification; yet another
example of the way that desire was displaced. Again, unlike others, Freud listened for
the metaphorical significance, and he settled upon the metaphor of “upstairs/downstairs”;
that is the displacement of unacceptable desires out of consciousness “down” to the
unconscious.
This of course is what is known as repression. Freud originally thought
repression was a conscious defense, but then moved on to view it as involuntary.
Hysterical people, he explained, “Do not know what they don’t want to know” (Freud,
1899). Still they- or something, rather- puts up resistance and blocks the goal of therapy,
which is associating to fill up gaps in memory. Screen memories illustrate the problem
very well; an “innocent”, supervalent idea is conscious and hides the offending repressed
idea. In summary, Freud developed a theory and technique that dealt with hysteria
differently, recognizing the desire and repression involved in the formation of symptoms.
His view of a mutative interpretation further conveys his theoretical views.

Mutative Interpretation
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In this section Freud’s view of mutative interpretation will be explored. As
discussed above, his attention was drawn to repressed desire. The aim of his
interpretations was to bring the unconscious to light and to fill in gaps of memory. So in
the act of remembering the patient was also coming to terms with his or her desire. In
Dora there is an unwavering attention to the figure of Herr K. that seems peculiar to this
case. Freud later felt he should have interpreted the transference and Dora’s unconscious
homosexual love for Frau K. This self-critique will be considered following a review of
the interpretations he made of Dora’s complicity in her father’s affair with Frau K., her
refusal of Herr K., and her dreams.
As Freud listened to Dora tell her story his interest was first provoked by Dora’s
refusal of Herr K.’s proposition. Later, when she adds an earlier scene in which he
grabbed and kissed her, Freud is surprised by her disgust. Not wanting to side with
bourgeois sexual morality he affirms that young girls have sexual feelings. Along these
lines, he views disgust, like guilt, to be a denial of unconscious desire. Hysterics are
unable or unwilling to feel sexual pleasure. This explains why he would assert that a
“healthy girl” would have felt something. So Freud has located, in her inability to
articulate what he believes a normal girl would feel, a repression, or an act of her
conscience denying a desire. Freud repeatedly contended that Dora wished to yield to
Herr K., and that she loved him. “Her illness was therefore an illustration of her love for
K.” (Freud, 1963, p. 32). He interpreted her symptoms quite directly in an attempt to
prove this to her. For example, she had an irritation in her throat due to a displacement of
the sensation of his “erect member” from their embrace; evidence of a denial of the
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pleasure she felt. She had aphonia when he was away, as opposed to Frau K, who was
sick when he was present. Thus, if Frau K expressed her hatred of her husband, Dora
was expressing her love. So Dora slapped him in the scene by the lake not because she
found his proposal indecent but because she was offended when she recognized, “You
know I get nothing from my wife” as the exact proposal he had used previously with the
governess. Throughout the treatment Freud took Dora’s “No”- particularly the denial of
his assertion that she loved Herr K.- as a confirmation, as an unconscious “Yes”. He
never relented, even up to the end when he suggested the possibility of Dora and Herr K.
marrying.
When Freud was convinced of the affair, taking Dora’s word over her father’s, he
did not react with empathy, but rather with curiosity about Dora’s complicity. How was
it possible that after the gifts and private walks with Herr K that she could be surprised
that he was attracted to her? She had ignored the warnings of her governess, who had
been aware of Dora’s father and Frau K.’s affair from the start. Though Dora had
respected the governess, she had written her off as jealous. And hadn’t she helped look
after Frau K’s children and kept them away from the home when she knew her father and
Frau K were together? Thus, Freud interpreted that she saw the exchange of Father-Frau
K. and Herr K.-Dora coming. Dora had little interest in talking abut this. Freud noted
that she would much rather complain about her father’s behavior. So Freud interpreted
these reproaches as self-reproaches. Again, turning her complaint back upon her. Not
because he wanted to blame her, but to draw attention to her unconscious wish.
In his interpretation of Dora’s dreams Freud paid attention to these reversals as
well as her identifications. For example, in the first dream Freud reversed fire to wet, and
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interpreted her fear as in fact a willingness to yield. Freud viewed his job of
interpretation to “discover the connecting link” or “establish the relation” between the
dream and the events with Herr K. (Freud, 1963, p. 57). He fastens on the “jewel case”.
In this dream he viewed Dora as indentifying with her father; her symptoms expressed a
sympathy with her father, but also a reproach “he has made me ill, just as he made
mother ill” (Freud, 1963, p.74). In the second dream he found her identifying with a
young suitor who was searching for a woman, and observing a painting of the Madonna.
This allows him to interpret her many questions about stations and boxes as inquiries
about the female genitals; the question “where is the key” is the corresponding question
about the male genitals. He found this curiosity to be supported by her use of medical
terms as puns for the female genitals. As Freud looks back at the second dream he states,
with an evident sense of success, “it filled a gap in her memory” and “made it possible to
obtain a deep insight into the origin of another of her symptoms” (Freud, 1963, p. 85).
Thus, his technique had helped to achieve his aim.
Now it is possible to track what Freud had hoped to accomplish with his
interpretations. From the beginning he instituted the “fundamental rule”, that the patient
should say whatever comes to mind. Freud continually encouraged Dora to associate.
The goal was to fill in her story and to acknowledge her unconscious desire as expressed
in her hysterical symptoms and dreams. Even with the failed attempt at convincing her of
her love for Herr K. Freud did manage to produce associations; Frau K. acknowledged
her friend also thought she like Herr K and she admitted that she may have liked him
before, but not anymore.
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Freud’s interpretations acknowledge the complicated structure of neurosis and the
overdetermination of symptoms. The symptoms cannot be reduced to a single cause and
the causes are interwoven across different contexts. Of course, his interpretations also
emphasized the importance of the sexual. When it comes to discussing the sexual he
repeatedly advocates being dry and direct. So for example when he catches an important
“switch-word”, “a man of means”, and realizes its counterpart is “impotent”, Freud
concludes Dora has a fantasy that Frau K. pleases her father with oral sex. However, he
does not stop there, he also connects this oral eroticism to her thumb sucking as a child.
These all are related to her cough, which has already been connected to her love for Herr
K. Thus, we find the overdetermination of her symptom, which involves multiple
contexts, childhood, sexuality, and an identification with her brother.
To set aside overdetermination and look again at “switch-words”, Freud finds in
these the opportunity to use the ambiguity to make connections between what is
supervalent, or excessively present, and that which is hidden. He views his task as
“extracting unconscious thoughts from the patient’s associations” (Freud, 1963, p. 103).
And these interpretations of what is displaced, condensed, or compromised helps to fill in
the gaps, thus enlarging her psychic capacity to know what she knows. Freud said Dora’s
favorite phrase was “I don’t remember that” (1963, p. 50), but he was certain that some
part of her did remember, did know, and his aim was to help her in a process of
interpreting and associating to reclaim her knowledge and desire. This was the process of
interpretation.
However, in the process a “complication” arose. Freud, reluctantly admitted he
had missed something incredibly important, something that did not fit into his Oedipal
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schema (boy for mommy and girl for daddy). In fact, it was something very un-Oedipal.
Dora loved Frau K. It is interesting that these revelations were relegated to the
marginalized position of the footnotes, even though he states that the more he thinks
about it, the more time that separates him from the case he believes “the fault in my
technique lays in this omission” (Frued, 1963, p. 110n). And again, he states, “Before I
had learnt the importance of the homosexual current of feelings in psychoneurotics, I was
often brought to a standstill in the treatment of my cases or found myself in complete
perplexity” (Freud, 1963, p. 110n). But Freud does not say what he should have done to
avoid this perplexity, or how realizing it earlier would have changed his interpretations.
It appears that he knew this was an important discovery, but he didn’t know what to make
of it.
Freud did spend considerable more time discussing his other self-criticism and
revelation, the importance of transference. This will be explored further in the next
section of the paper on Freud’s view of the clinical relationship.
The Clinical Relationship
For the most part it appears that Freud views the real relationship as an
obstruction to the interpretive process. He rarely comments on it and instead focuses on
the patients unconscious as the object of study. Many of his views on the clinical
relationship are expressed in the postscript, when Freud reflects upon the importance of
transference. He notes that transference is not specific to psychoanalysis, but the clinical
relationship allows for it to manifest in a unique way. The transference is problematic,
but necessary. At first regarded as an obstacle, it is reevaluated as an essential tool.
Nothing but the transference can give the necessary “conviction” of the effectiveness of
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an analysis. He explains he failed in the Dora case because he “did not master the
transference” (Freud, 1963, p. 108). Freud uses his failure to recognize and elevate
transference to a preeminent position within the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis.
In his view, had he been able to properly interpret the transference he would have
been able to use it to further help Dora continue with her associations and make
connections. He states that because he did not interpret, and because Dora did not
remember, she acted out her feelings. She left Freud just as she had left Herr K.’s house,
and just as she had wanted to flee the house in her dream. Freud laments, “I ought to
have listened to the warning myself” (1963, p. 109).
Let’s quickly remind ourselves of the prevailing metaphors that Freud used in
describing his function: picklock, investigator, translator, and archaeologist. Looking
back at the dreams in question one finds Freud was interested in connecting the dream to
Herr K. Dora did oblige, which is to admit Freud was on a track (if not the right one).
Still it seems as if he felt he knew what the translation was, or what the final look of the
ancient relic was, without first relying on the patient’s material. This will be much
discussed in the later section on critiques of Freud. Still, it is important to point out that
Freud was clearly not entirely working off his own constructions. For he repeatedly
states he could not finish the analysis of the dream because the treatment broke off too
soon. So even when left with the entire latent content of the dream Freud allows that he
is helpless without the patient’s associations. Therefore, though the focus is supposed to
be on the patient’s unconscious, the method includes the difficult process of the ego
making its way into the unconscious and this participation of the patient is crucial, indeed
it amounts to the “working through” that is the very essence of therapeutic action.
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The Position of the Analyst
In this section Freud’s position will be discussed. Earlier in this paper it was
determined that the position of the analyst could be determined by the attention, function,
neutrality, discipline and metaphor an analyst proclaims. As mentioned above Freud’s
attention is directed toward the manifestation of the unconscious, and he is much less
concerned with the patient’s ego, in fact it often gets in the way. As shown above in the
section on interpretation, the analyst’s function is to facilitate the process by which the
unconscious becomes conscious.
What position did Freud seek to maintain? Freud himself wonders about the
“part” he played. Rather, he asks, “Should I have acted a part” (Freud, 1963, p. 100)?
He considers that having given warmth, empathy, or affection could have been beneficial
for her, “providing her a substitute” (Freud, 1963, p.101), or at least kept her in treatment.
Yet, he decides against it, on the merit that he must set a limit out of respect, both for the
patient and the art of psychoanalysis; that is, he will not use suggestion or the relationship
to affect a cure. It must be mentioned that in the very next paragraph he compares his
situation to that of Herr K. In all of his second-guessing, Freud never considers his own
feelings of countertransference.
From beginning to end Freud attempted to be “neutral”. He listened to Dora’s
story and her father’s story while postponing judgment. In the end he sided with Dora’s
account. However, he did not step in to participate on her behalf, rather he questioned
her own unconscious motives in keeping this problem going. Also, Freud maintained
throughout the importance of sexual factors in Dora’s symptoms, “No one who disdains
this key will ever be able to unlock the door” (Freud, 1963, p. 105). Thus, Freud
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maintained throughout that he held the key and he never ceased in pushing forward with
his interpretations. It seems he believed he had to press on against her resistances and
continue to build his evidence until she would finally be convinced. The metaphor of
picklock seemed to be particularly apropos and it is used throughout the text. Freud
seemed to be forcing his way in, regardless of Dora’s protests, and she eventually fled.
In summary, the position of the analyst is to not “play the game”, to maintain
neutrality, to keep focus on underlying infantile sexual wishes and conflict, and to
function as one who, through interpretations, helps the patient to gain insight.
Critiques of Dora
Numerous books and articles have been devoted to Freud’s case of Dora. For
example, Psychoanalytic Inquiry (2005) devoted an entire issue to a reevaluation of the
case of Dora a century later. In Dora’s Case (1990) gave a feminist treatment to the case
and Freud, Dora, and Vienna 1900 (Decker, 1991) looked at the historical context of the
case. This section will give brief summary of the critiques of the case of Dora beginning
with the history of hysteria and it’s treatment, moving to a critique of Freud’s conduct,
and finishing with a discussion of the context.
“Freud invented psychoanalysis on the basis of his clinical experience with
hysterical patients, nearly all of them women, and of the self-analysis he performed to
cure his own hysterical symptoms” (Bernheimer & Kahane, 1990, p. 1). As was stated
previously, hysteria had been conceptualized as a woman’s disease in which the
wandering uterus needed to be coaxed back into place. The cure was marriage and
pregnancy. Freud had developed his treatment after abandoning electrotherapy,
hypnotism and the seduction theory. He reversed the seduction theory and found sexual
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fantasies belonging to early childhood. In so doing he relied upon the free association of
his patients to produce the material for his interpretations. When he found that patients
resisted their associations at some points, and later, that transference interrupted
treatment, each time he adopted these obstructions and found ways to make use of them,
thus developing the psychoanalytic technique through work with, and in response to,
hysterics.
Freud says, “we are obliged to pay as much attention in our case histories to the
purely human and social circumstances of our patients as to the somatic data and the
symptoms” (Freud, 1963, p.12). Marcus (1990) describes the fear and frustration
surrounding sexuality in Vienna. Venereal diseases were prevalent, as they were in
Dora’s family. At this time “women transformed their repressed hostility and desire into
physical symptoms that simultaneously acknowledged and disowned those feelings”
(Bernheimer, 1990, p. 6).
Thus, if hysteria is fundamental to psychoanalysis, then so to is feminine
sexuality. But Freud was notoriously poor at representing female desire. This is a
common critique of Freud. As Kahane puts it (1990), “As brilliant as Freud was in
constructing a narrative of Dora’s desire, he essentially represented his own” (p. 20).
Thus, she and many others view it as “a paradigmatic text of patriarchal
assumptions about female desire” (Kahane, 1990, p. 24). This critique is different from
those of Erikson (1990) who stressed that Dora was an adolescent who had specific
developmental needs, or Sachs (2005) who saw Dora as a legitimate victim of trauma, so
viewed the interpretation of conflicted libidinal desires as off base, or from Bornstein
(2005) who expressed contrition for having once viewed Freud’s treatment as flawless
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due to group idealization of the Master. All of the critiques begin with the objection that
Freud interpreted too forcefully, too deeply, and too soon (Verhaeghe, 1999; Decker,
1991; Kahane & Bernheimer, 1990; Gay, 1998). They also include a parallel critique that
Freud neglected the clinical relationship and should have been more empathetic. These
critiques involve alterations in the basic treatment, but the feminist critique questions the
entire project of psychoanalysis and conducts an “analysis” of Freud.
This critique/analysis of Freud points out that Freud, as mentioned above,
analyzed hysterics, and included himself as one. Freud’s self-analysis was conducted
partly through letters to his friend Fliess. In his relationship to Fliess, Freud found “the
rebellious over-compensation of the male”, a response to “repudiation of femininity”; or,
“The resistance against adopting a passive attitude toward another man” (quoted in
Bernheimer, 1990, p. 16). Some have pointed out that Freud may have had unrecognized
erotic feelings toward Dora, but this line of thought points out not only his desire for
Dora, but also his identification with her.
Mahony (1996) notes that Freud mentions over 20 times that his case study has
gaps and is fragmented. Hertz (1990) suggests Freud unconsciously identifies with Dora,
a girl who, as a hysteric, has a story full of holes. Moi (1990) proposes Freud’s certainty
that he could achieve a seamless case study if given more time, belies his fear of his own
femininity, as if he is saying, “I have no holes!” Aside from an analysis of his confidence
as overcompensation for the fragmentation regarding his text, some have brought
attention to his understanding of the transference. Sprengnether (1990) points out it
seems clear that Freud would rather identify with the virile Herr K, rather than the weak
father. And Collins et. al. (1990) shows that he ignores the women, Frau K and the
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mother, in the transference altogether. Appignanesi and Forrester (2004) assert that quite
contrary to Freud’s assertion that he never “played a part” he was all too willing to play
the part of Herr K. However, as much as Freud disavowed the role of woman, in the
transference he played the part of Frau K. and the abandoned governess.
Dora, too, as evidenced by the slap to Herr K., refused to identify with the K.’s
governess. This is the question of femininity, or more generally, identity that Lacan
picked up on. As Decker (1991) argued, Dora (as a hysteric) faced very real limits,
which made her more likely to develop hysterical symptoms. As Freud had shown as an
8 yr old she was wild, then became feminine and well-behaved; she did not have the
same opportunities as her brother. Freud also had commented on the crucial role
governesses play in bourgeois sexuality, treated as “worthless female material” (Freud in
Appignanesi & Forrester, 2004, p. 161). Freud noted the irony that the disturbance
caused by the father’s philandering with a governess was often paid for by his very own
daughter in hysterical symptoms. This was certainly the case with Dora. Decker (1991)
also describe how both Dora and Freud were also at risk due to their social position as
Jews in Vienna. It is no small consequence that Freud opened a clinical practice only
because he could not secure a research position at a university due to anti-Semitism
(Decker, 1991).
One final point of interest is what ended up happening to the real Dora, Ida Bauer.
Like Freud, she had to immigrate out of Vienna due to the advance of the Nazi’s. She
finally settled in New York City, where she died from the same disease her mother had.
Deutsch (1991), a follower of Freud, as luck would have it met with Dora in her middle
age. His account is notorious for its cruelty, in which she is described as “one of the most
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repulsive hysterics I had ever met” (Deutsch, 1991, p. 43). Much of Deutsch’s account
has been dismissed. Still, it does seem that Dora’s life was marked by poor relationships
and continuing, uncomfortable hysterical ailments; however, an interesting fact has
emerged. Ida, in her adulthood, became a master of contract bridge and taught and
played it regularly. Fascinatingly, her partner was none other than Frau K. If nothing
else this shows she was able to achieve a sublimation of her love for Frau K. As
Appignanesi and Forrester (2004) put it, “they had retained their love of those games
whose skill lies in the secret yet coded communications within and across a foursome” (p.
167). This fact is still more intriguing as Lacan used the bridge game as a metaphor for
the clinical relationship. This shall be explored in the next chapter.
Summary
In this chapter Freud’s case of Dora was utilized to explore his theory of
therapeutic action. Four elements of the case were focused on, they were: Dora’s
complicity in the affair, the scene by the lake in which Dora slaps Herr K., Dora’s
relationship with Frau K., and the transference. Attention was given to Freud’s use of
interpretation, the clinical relationship, and the position of the analyst. Critiques of Freud
were presented, which leads to Lacan’s critique. It will be seen that Lacan’s critique
differs in some significant ways from those already presented. Chapter Four will present
this critique and offer insight into Lacan’s theory of therapeutic action.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LACAN AND THE SYMBOLIC
Introduction
This chapter will present Lacan’s critique of the case of Dora. The main text used
will be Lacan’s “Intervention on Transference” (Lacan, 1990). The end of this chapter
will also discuss some of Lacan’s theoretical developments from the 1950’s to the
1960’s. In order to more effectively understand Lacan’s insistence that psychoanalysis
must work in the symbolic, some concepts introduced in this chapter, particularly the
discourse of the master, will be further explored in the final discussion chapter.
The first section follows “Intervention on Transference” in which Lacan attempts
to show how Freud’s interventions are organized around three dialectical reversals. Just
as some of the earlier critics have viewed Dora within the larger context of patriarchy,
Lacan’s critique is a protest directed at the dominant psychoanalytic school of the era,
ego psychology. The chapter follows the three dialectic developments, an explanation of
the imaginary, a review of the “scene by the lake”, and a definition of
countertransference.
In his introduction to the text, Lacan announces that his aim was to “once again
accustom people’s ears to the term subject” (Lacan, 1990, p 92). With the use of the term
“subject”, he distances himself from ego psychology and what he calls the objectification
of the individual. In Seminar I he calls the ego psychology approach a “one body
psychology” (Lacan, 1952, p. 11), because it ignores that the psychoanalytic process is
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intersubjective1. The true significance of Freud’s discovery, he argues, is that the subject
emerges through a discourse. This discourse is dialectical and acknowledges the
significance of the unconscious. Yet, contemporary psychoanalysis, he charges, would
prefer to list the attributes of “homo psychologicus”, thus reducing the subject to an
objectof study (i.e. the ego) to be catalogued and mastered. In keeping with the
opposition of the imaginary and symbolic, the ego is on the side of the imaginary and the
symbolic on the side of the unconscious.
Lacan views his work as a necessary return to Freud, protecting “the tradition
entrusted to our keeping” (Lacan, 1990, p. 93). After all, there is no school of
“unconscious psychology”; Lacan means to emphasize the revolutionary nature of
Freud’s discovery of a split subject, comprised of an ego and an unconscious. At this
point in his paper Lacan announces that he will attempt to define the transference in
terms of the dialectic development of the case of Dora.

The Dialectic Developments

Lacan uses the term “dialectic” following Socrates and Hegel (2004). First,
Socrates used this procedure to expose the contradictions of knowledge in his
counterparts and to use this destabilization to draw out the truth. In this way the search

1

Lacan later abandons intersubjectivity, viewing any dual relation as imaginary.

Symbolic relations are triadic, the relation between two subjects is always already
mediated by the Other (language, the Law, etc.).
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for truth is a discursive process that breaks through illusory certainties. The case study
shows that Freud confronted Dora’s contradictions in such a way. Secondly, Hegel’s
account is centered on the subject’s need of recognition by an “other” (Hegel, 2004).
This approach is clearly at the imaginary level; later, Lacan developed the dialectic to the
symbolic level by asserting that the subject’s desire was constituted by the Other. Unlike
Hegel, Lacan disabuses his readers of any belief in a final synthesis and absolute truth.
Still, for the purposes of the Dora case he clearly viewed psychoanalytic treatment as a
discursive process that advances dialectically. A final point, the dialectical method also
provides a critique of the ego and the imaginary. For the dialectical process exposes the
illusory solidity of the ego and its claim of self-knowledge.
Lacan proposes that the case of Dora involves three dialectic reversals. First,
Freud asked Dora to reconsider her place in the drama and to acknowledge her
involvement in the situation about which she complained so bitterly. Secondly, Freud
suggested that Dora’s jealousy of Frau K. concealed another feeling. This was a fact that
Freud conceded he realized only too late. Third, Freud regarded Dora’s fascination with
Frau K. as concealing another, more primary question.
At the beginning of the treatment Dora tested Freud to see if he was as
hypocritical as her father. Freud, unlike many others before him, did not blame the
hysterical patient. In fact he believed Dora’s account of, what Lacan called, this “odious
exchange” (Lacan, 1990, p. 97). Nevertheless, Freud pointed out that Dora was not
simply a passive victim; rather she was instrumental to the affair. Her participation
allowed for personal gains, such as the attention of Herr K. and an identification with her
father.
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At the point of recognition that Dora gained something, Lacan brings attention to
the complicated meaning of the exchange of gifts, which act as a form of “honorable
redress through which the bourgeois male has managed to combine the reparation due his
legitimate wife with concern for the patrimony” (Lacan, 1990, p. 96). Indeed, Dora
received gifts both from Herr K. and her father, which placed her structurally in the place
of the absent wife. The identification with her father implies the Oedipal complex is at
work. Dora is very vocal about her jealous disapproval of the “subject-rival” Frau K.
Following Freud, Lacan asserts, “this jealousy expresses itself in such a supervalent
form” that it “calls for an explanation that goes beyond its apparent motives” (Lacan,
1990, p. 97). This jealousy of Frau K., and here is the dialectic reversal, conceals an
interest. This is the “gynaecophilia” that caught Freud’s attention enough to question his
masterful interpretation and the “normal” Oedipal schema, but he was still left
“perplexed”.
The third development of truth, then, is Freud’s pronouncement that Dora’s
homosexual love for Frau K. “was the strongest unconscious current in her life”. Lacan
notes the comments on Frau K’s “adorable white body” and Freud’s view that she spoke
in accents “more appropriate to a lover than to a defeated rival”. Further, the question
remained why Dora had remained so loyal to Frau K. even after she had betrayed her.
This brings us to the third dialectical reversal, which Lacan says is “the one that would
yield to us the real value of the object that Frau K. is for Dora” (Lacan, 1990, p. 97).
This is the reversal Freud was unable to make because he was so “mystified” by feminine
desire.
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Lacan shows that Frau K. functions not simply as a love object, but also as a
solution to the “mystery of femininity” (Lacan, 1990, p. 98). Lacan declares this is
evidenced in the second dream, which shows Dora struggling to come up with an answer
to her sexual identity. The question is not merely “Who do I love?” but also “What sort
of woman will I become?” Dora, who was described by Freud as “wild” and “masculine”
up until the age of eight, was confronted by the harsh facts of the objectification of
women and her loss of freedom and opportunity, in contrast to her brother who had the
privilege to continue his studies at a university.

Imago
Lacan draws attention to the importance of Dora’s imago, a memory of sucking
her thumb while tugging on the ear of her brother. The imago is a term Lacan will later
abandon and it is possible here to see some tension between his imaginary and (still
developing) symbolic interpretations. He regards the scene as an “imaginary matrix”
which shows that “her only opening to the object was through the intermediary of a
masculine partner” (Lacan, 1990, p. 98). The imago is clearly related to Lacan’s “mirror
stage” in which a paradigmatic moment structures the subject. The mirror stage was
originally confined to an actual historical event experienced by infants. An infant
recognizes itself in a mirror for the first time and the fragmentary nature of the lived body
is contrasted with the unity of the image; the child is struck by the disparity of its own
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subjectivity and its image2. Lacan points out that this type of imaginary identification
bears the characteristics of rivalry, aggressiveness and narcissistic alienation, which mark
all imaginary relations. However, there is also a symbolic element to this configuration.
The imago has a deep impact; Dora’s subjectivity is “caught up” in a representation of
satisfaction.
The imago, which shows Dora finding the object through a masculine
intermediary, is played out in Dora’s identification with Herr K. and her father in desire
for Frau K. Here Lacan criticizes Freud’s interpretation because he imposes a
heterosexual content. For example, Lacan points out the error in assuming that the oral
sex between Frau K. and Dora’s father was fellatio, when it was more likely that an
impotent man would perform cunnilingus. However, the failure is not so much that
Freud imposed a heterosexual content, but that he turns the unconscious into an
objectifiable property and fails to propose Dora’s desire as a question (Rose in Bernheim
& Kahane, 1990). Lacan points out that Dora’s fascination with Frau K. could also
include her fascination with the painting of the Madonna and the “subjective impasse” of
being a feminine object of desire. Freud missed this because he included himself within
the imaginary as an other (through his identification with Herr K. and his heterosexual
prejudice), rather than questioning from the outside as an Other. The goal of analysis

2

There is a symbolic element to this imaginary scene in which the child looks from this

image (other) back to its parent (Other) so as to ratify the experience. The parent
typically might say something like: “That’s you, that’s Dora!”
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ought to be a radical questioning of the position she assumes relative to her desire.
However, Freud’s response was directed toward the imaginary and social adaptation.
As was shown above in the first dialectic development, Freud was able to work
successfully with Dora when she tested him to see if he was like her father. He proved he
was not an imaginary “other”, another person like all the rest. He was not someone she
had to struggle with, or measure herself against, but someone who caused her to question
her desire, an “Other”. This was a completely different type of relationship. Freud
challenged Dora to acknowledge her collusion, a challenge she was able to rise to. Yet,
Freud was not able to maintain this position, rather he acted the part of “the master”. He
ceased asking questions of Dora’s desire and began answering them.
The Scene by the Lake
As described previously Herr K. made a proposition to Dora and she slapped him
in the face; moreover, this experience was the cause of a dramatic change in her attitude
toward her father’s affair, which until this point she had played an instrumental role in
protecting.
As Freud put it, the secret lies in how Herr K. propositioned Dora, by saying of
Frau K., “My wife is nothing to me.” Lacan imagines Dora’s response: “If she is nothing
to you, then what are you to me” (Lacan, 1990, p. 101)? As Freud says, “Hysterics love
by proxy” and Dora loved Frau K. through her father and “the virile character” of Herr K.
Likewise, she felt her father loved Frau K. through her. Frau K. was crucial to Dora‘s
question. The function of this circuit was something that Freud had only begun to
understand, and Lacan completes the thought: Dora identified with her father’s desire, not
with her father. Father and Herr K. loved Frau K. and it was through a masculine
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intermediary (in line with the imago) that she could participate. When Herr K.
propositioned her, the sexual relationship became too real and she was confronted with
the question of her desire. Lacan made the interpretation that the scene in question has
more to do with the “mystery of femininity”.
Further, she realized she was a sexual object for Herr K. and an object of and
“odious exchange” for father. “Her father was merely selling her to someone” (Rabate,
2005, p. 90). This exogamic exchange: “I have received a wife and I owe a daughter”
(Rabate, 2005, p. 90), is central to the reproduction of patriarchy (Findlay, 1994).
Previously she could tolerate the affair since she had a place within it (she was important
and loved). But, after the scene by the lake the fantasy collapsed, “the enchantment
under which she had been living for years” (Lacan, 1990, p. 101), and everything became
terribly clear. She was a woman among others, which Dora understood, without any
illusion, was a terrible position. This is evidenced in her second dream, which was full of
negative signifiers for femininity and the metaphor of being trapped. All the women in
the case have been dishonored or thrown aside: her mother, the two governesses, and now
even the prized Frau K. was “nothing”. So the imaginary solution had failed and
destroyed her fantasy, which had supported her sense of self and love. The anxiety
provoked by such a loss resulted in a regressive desire for her father. To the extent he
failed her, which was great, she had to love him all the more to resolve her Oedipal
complex (Rabate, 2005).
Freud failed her in pressing his opinion that “in fact she was in love with Herr
K.”, thus “introducing Herr K. as a normalizing object of heterosexual love” (Lacan in
Rabate, 2005, p. 91). But as is shown in Dora’s fascination with the Madonna painting
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and her identification with male characters, Dora was involved in a contemplation of
femininity. As stated above, not simply: “Who do I love?” but also “Who am I?”
Previously she had been a good girl who helped her father and was friends with the K.
family. It can be assumed her relationship to Herr and Frau K. was ambivalent, both
uncertain yet providing attention and security. The sudden awareness of her status left
her unprotected and at an impasse. Decker (1991) reports that Dora appears to have
persisted along this line: she married a man who was often ill and cheated on her (like her
father), and she showed the same obsession with cleanliness and psychosomatic
complaints that her mother had to the point that she died of the very same disease her
mother died from. Yet, Decker (1991) also reported that, though her life appeared
miserable on many levels, she still was able to find some relief in the game of bridge,
participating in social circles, and achieving no small measure of success with her
partner- Frau K.
Transference and Countertransference
It is precisely at the place reached in the scene by the lake that we can identify
how psychoanalysis, at the level of the symbolic, would have helped her. For the
symbolic is the level of desire. Trapped as she was in a web of identifications, which had
failed her, Dora may have been able to articulate the truth of her desire for Frau K. but as
the case shows, Freud was unable to allow this. He was too devoted to his own hope that
these “star-crossed lovers” as Lacan mockingly calls them, should end up together. But
why?
Freud’s failure, Lacan says, was not simply, as Freud believed, that he should
have pointed out the transference; rather, he could not free himself from his prejudice. It
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is, Lacan states, “the same prejudice that falsifies the conception of the Oedipus complex
from the start, by making it define as natural, rather than normative, the predominance of
the paternal figure” (Lacan, 1990, p. 100). In addition to his heterosexual prejudice,
Freud felt sympathy for Herr K., which kept him believing in a (heteronormative,
Oedipus complex affirming) “triumph of love” for Dora and Herr K. One must wonder
why it is Herr K.. of all the pitiable characters in this case, that attracted Freud’s
sympathy. Here Lacan agrees with those critiques presented above that draw attention to
his countertransferential identification with Herr K (though keep in mind his critique
predated the feminist critiques by three decades). Lacan did not explore issues of
passivity and femininity here, but merely stated that Freud “put himself rather too much
in the place of Herr K.” (Lacan, 1990, p. 101). That is, Freud entered the game as an
imaginary “other”. One can guess that his repeated mention of “virility” that apparently
attracted Dora so, may have been appealing to the middle-aged Freud as well.
It is this phrase: “normative, not natural” that best captures Lacan’s critique of
Freud’s prejudice (and that later gains traction among feminists and queer theorists).
Lacan also shows how this interfered with Freud’s interpretations. “It is odd to see how
he always interprets as confessions what are in fact the varied responses that Dora argues
against him” (Lacan, 1990, p. 101). This is Freud taking the position of the “master”; he
doesn’t need to listen because he already knows the answer. Knowledge had no room for
truth.
In Dora, Lacan does not view the transference as anything particularly revelatory;
rather it is an “arrest of the dialectical process” (Lacan, 1990, p. 102) and “an error on the
part of the analyst, if only of wishing too much for the good of the patient” (Lacan, 1990,
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p. 103). Still, though the transference is only a “ruse,” it is useful, because it marks
where the dialectical process has gone off track and can set the process in motion again.
Lacan defines the countertransference as “the sum total of the prejudices,
passions, and difficulties of the analyst, or even of his insufficient information, at any
given moment of the dialectical process” (Lacan, 1990, p. 102). Countertransference and
transference are here presented side by side because by Seminar XI Lacan had come to
view the transference as something affected by each party, and felt a differentiation of the
two wrongly implied an equal relationship (Lacan, 1981). Countertransference is the
resistance of the analyst, or better, the analyst’s influence on the transference. In this
case, Freud’s idealized identification with Herr K. and his view of heterosexuality as
natural, rather than normative.
In this way transference can profitably be understood as divided into symbolic
and imaginary transference. The imaginary transference is a form of resistance and takes
place when the analyst puts (or is put) him or herself in the position of an “other”. If
Dora did in fact act in revenge was it not in some ways provoked by Freud’s influence?
This is the imaginary transference, which is characterized by a dual relationship of
struggle. Freud took her resistance personally, viewing it as “vengeance”. On the other
hand, symbolic transference focuses on the content of the transference, and finds the
repetition there, thus opening a path to free association and the articulation of desire. In
this case the analyst understands the speech and enactments (the representations of
desire) as directed to an “Other”, thus revealing the patients relationship to desire.
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Summary
Before moving on to an account of the development of Lacan’s thought from the
1950’s to the 1960’s, the main critiques presented by Lacan of the case of Dora will be
reviewed. First, Freud gained enough credibility that he was able to engage Dora in a
questioning of her motives. Dora’s willingness to do so was due to what Lacan calls
“the desire of the analyst”. However, as Rabate (2005) puts it, though Freud got “Dora to
take a good look at herself” this was “the only successful moment in the treatment” (p.
85). Freud did understand the importance of the transference and began to see the
importance of Frau K., but was unable to make use of this in the treatment.
In his critique, Lacan treated transference and countertransference as essentially
the same thing. The emergence is a “ruse”; an impasse that interrupts and yet also offers
a chance to revive the dialectical process. Rather than placing the blame on “resistance”
of the patient he puts emphasis on the position of the analyst. Lacan did acknowledge
that Freud’s proposed transference interpretation would have effected an improvement,
but he views this as an assertion of the ego, which is not a psychoanalytic cure. He
would have missed, by asserting Herr K., but the problem is not her male identification,
but identification as such. For identification is at the level of the imaginary. Such an
intervention leaves a structural account of desire untouched.
This is relevant to his other mistake. Freud misrecognized the meaning of Dora’s
fascination with Frau K. Again, it is not that Freud answered incorrectly (which he did)
but more fundamentally that he answered at all. This has been shown in his interpretation
of the slap of Herr K. at the scene by the lake. For, here he failed to pose Dora’s desire as
a question.
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Changes in Lacan’s Theory
“Intervention on Transference” was written fairly early in Lacan’s career and
many changes occurred in his theory since that time. Throughout the chapter, effort has
been made to indicate the most relevant modifications. As such, the text does offer the
opportunity to see Lacan’s theory in a state of development. In his critique of the Dora
case, such an occasion is presented in his discussion of the imago and intersubjectivity, as
well as the subject and alterity. A further look into these concepts will help to clarify the
imaginary and symbolic. Before this, however, the style of the text will be briefly
discussed.
Though “Intervention on Transference” is fairly straightforward, Lacan’s texts
often seem to aim at frustration. This style is indicative of his belief that “to think, it is
often better not to understand” (Lacan, 2006, p. 252). As with his critique of ego
psychology, which affirms the ego as a totalizing unity, coherence is critiqued as a
misrecognition that is exclusionary in essence. This attitude is also expressed in his
attitude toward how Freud’s legacy has been systematized and watered-down. Lacan
holds that Freud’s thought should be “perennially open to revision” but it has been
reduced to a “collection of hackneyed phrases” (Lacan, 1991, p. 1). Lacan’s difficult
style, evidenced by his dialectical “thought in motion”, is likely a strategy of protecting
his thought from such reductive systematization.
Perhaps the most well known psychoanalytic phenomenon is the “Freudian slip”,
which is when an error is made in speech or action (or even in audio or visual perception)
due to an unconscious desire. Psychoanalysis contends that though these slips are
unintended they are not meaningless. The Freudian slip seems foreign but comes from
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the “inside”. But if the ego disavows this speech, what does this say about the subject?
Lacan elaborated when he famously said, “the unconscious is the Other’s discourse”
(Lacan, 2001, p. 312) and “the unconscious is structured like a language” (Lacan, 2001,
p. 259). Each of these statements set up a provocative relationship between the subject
and alterity. These slips, dreams, or symptoms represent how the unconscious can
interrupt the ego and contradict one’s self-image or intention. The subject is not simply
the ego; the subject is split and endlessly desiring. Further, this desire, as unconscious is
not, as Jung would have it, a storehouse of essential truths; rather, it is radically other.
With this in mind it can be seen that psychoanalysis is the practice of eliciting and
listening to the unconscious and revealing a logic that the subject as ego, is not conscious
of.
This highlights an aspect of the imago. The imago represented a fantasy for Dora,
and as such exposes an unconscious schema of her relationship to desire. Since it is an
image it was originally taken as imaginary, but a fantasy may be composed of images and
speech from others. The psychoanalytic value of the fantasy is that it is a defense against
lack in the symbolic (Verhaeghe, 1999). The fantasy is just the sort of unconscious
material necessary to set in motion the dialectic method that will pass through the
imaginary and into the symbolic.
In his critique of the Dora case, Lacan makes the case for intersubjectivity when
he criticizes the “one-body” psychology of contemporary psychoanalysis.
Originally, this position was meant to highlight the dialectic, dialogic nature of truth. Yet
the concept of intersubjectivity, like imago, did not remain. For Lacan there cannot be an
unmediated subject-to-subject relation. This is why the goal of “authenticity” misses the
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point. Language structures and mediates all relation, so there is nothing “im-mediate” or
outside the symbolic. This is why he rejects dual relations as imaginary and Lacan’s
schema often propose a three-term or even four-term structure (as in the bridge
metaphor).
Each of these examples represent a larger shift from the image to desire. As was
shown in detail in the differentiation between imaginary and symbolic transference, the
clinical relation is a subject-Other relation that is fundamentally asymmetrical. The
importance of alterity in Lacan is evidenced in that the divided subject is split into the
ego and the unconscious, each term materializes in relation to the other/Other. The ego
comes into being through a (mis)recognition of “the other” and the unconscious is the
discourse of “the Other”. The Other, which had not been fully developed in Lacan’s
early work, introduces a very different sort of alterity. As Lacan said, “This discourse of
the other is not the discourse of the abstract other, of the other in the dyad, of my
correspondent, nor even of my slave, it is the discourse of the circuit in which I am
integrated” (Lacan, 1989, p. 89). This is a non-subjective other. As Dean (2004)
explains, “the subject’s communication partner is not the other but the signifying chain
into which he or she is articulated” (p. 44). The signifying chain is what makes up the
subject’s symbolic world. All of this points to one of Lacan’s key principles, and
certainly one that led him to so brutally criticize ego psychology, the split subject is in a
state of lack and disharmony between language and the body. Lacan says of Freud, “his
discovery is that man isn’t entirely in man” (1988, p. 72). In Seminar XVII Lacan puts it
another way: we do not use language; language uses us (2007). The signifying chain, or
symbolic order, exists before one is born and after one dies.
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Lacan proposed three orders: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. The
imaginary is the realm of the specular, which leads to recognition as well as
misrecognition. The imaginary is an attempt to give unity to the lack. There are yet
other realms; some things may never appear in the mirror. The symbolic is the realm of
language, desire, and the law. The imaginary is in the realm of the ego, whereas the
symbolic is the realm of the unconscious and desire. There is yet another realm proposed
by Lacan: the real. Just as the symbolic may not be represented in the imaginary, so to
the real exceeds the symbolic. The real is the nonsymbolized or the impossible.
Traumatic experience provides a good model.

Lacan noted in his discussion of

resistance that putting the traumatic event into words is an act of symbolization and it can
have therapeutic effects. But the “real” (or traumatic) resists being put into words. Thus,
resistance is a natural part of the process of symbolization and not simply a willful
defiance on the part of the patient.
Part of Lacan’s theory can simply be understood as a reminder of lack. If the
imaginary is the presentation of an illusory unity, then the symbolic gives voice to that
impossibility. The other, whether a celebrity, a person on the street, or even (as shown in
the mirror stage) one’s own image, can threaten to provoke anxiety at one’s own
imperfection. The other can appear as complete, without the doubt and unhappiness that
one feels. This is supported in the symbolic, as Lacan says, desire is a lack, and can
never be fully articulated. All of this leads to a final point. The split subject, separated
from the real of nature and introduced to human world suffers a loss that can never be
overcome. The remainder of this split is the object a, a representative of the fundamental
disharmony between language and the body. Lacan offers no solution to this lack, this
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disharmony, rather he introduces four discourses, or positions that subject can take up:
hysteric, master, university, and analyst. This theoretical development was clearly deeply
influenced by the issues raised in the case of Dora. In the Seminar XVII, as he introduces
the four discourses Lacan (2007) makes repeated reference to the Dora case. He begins
by commenting on the turbulent time of the university (also a critique of ego
psychology), but more importantly the schema includes the master (the position Freud
took), the position of the hysteric (Dora’s position), and the analyst (thus further
clarifying and refining the position of the analyst).
To review, Lacan developed his theory of the split subject (ego/unconscious) by
insisting on the fundamental disharmony between the body and language and the lack
that constitutes desire. Intersubjectivity gave way to a radical alterity in which
recognition by an other is less important than an essential questioning of the subjects
desire relative to the Other. This has lead to a clarification of the symbolic as well as an
introduction of the real. The object a is a result of the cut and functions as the cause of
desire- an impossible, endless seeking of the lost subject-object unity.
Lacan’s critique of the case of Dora has proven valuable in three specific ways.
First, because it displays the importance of posing desire as a question and even further
proposes the goal of therapy to be a radical questioning of the subject’s relationship to
desire and the Other. Secondly, it shows the ethical danger of the analyst’s ego (exposing
Freud’s “knowledge” as prejudice). Finally, it illustrates, particularly through a
differentiation of imaginary and symbolic transference, how the dialectical questioning
might reveal, without solving the question, the very structure of desire. The next chapter
will relate what has been discussed here to the larger question of therapeutic action.
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Therefore the Lacanian view of interpretation, the clinical relationship and the position of
the analyst will be discussed in depth. A final section will utilize the four discourses to
refine the central themes already discussed.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION
Introduction
In this final chapter the research question of what is meant by working in the
symbolic will be addressed through an elaboration of Lacan’s therapeutic action. Aspects
of Freudian and Lacanian theory will be differentiated, including Lacan’s critique of ego
psychology. Finally, Lacan’s “discourse of the analyst” will be examined.
Lacan’s Therapeutic Action
Having developed Lacan’s critique, his theory of therapeutic action will now be
presented. As has been previously determined this will include an examination of
interpretation, the clinical relationship, and the position of the analyst.
Interpretation
Lacan’s view of interpretation is closely tied to desire. In order to clarify the
importance of desire he juxtaposes it with demand. The analyst should not take the
patient’s statements as forthright demands, but rather acknowledge the concealed desire.
Thus, it is the role of the analyst to bring desire to the fore. This highlights the
importance of Freud’s psychoanalytic technique as a particular kind of listening. The
patient will soon see that the analyst takes nothing at face value and refuses to see
communication as straightforward. The analyst runs interference in what the patient may
prefer to portray as clear-cut. By maintaining this position the analyst brings the patient
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to question his or her motives. This was one intervention Freud made successfully in the
Dora case.
Interpretation could be mistaken for its synonym, explanation. However, this is
not what Lacan has in mind. The analyst could explain the latent desire underlying the
manifest demand. When a patient has a dream or begins to question an action, the
therapist could use his or her superior understanding to supply the missing meaning. And
this was something Freud did repeatedly in the case of Dora. This is what Lacan called
taking “the position of the master”. It is a position easy to fall into, particularly with
hysterics, who are more likely to demand that their questions be answered.
Returning to the manner of interpretation, Lacan has said: “An interpretation
whose effects one understands is not a psychoanalytic interpretation” (Lacan in Fink,
1993, p. 45). This is a critique of ego psychology, as well as the “good feeding”
advocated by object relations. A direct interpretation will result in an identification with
the analyst as well as dependency. The purpose is not to give an answer, no matter how
brilliant. Rather, the purpose of an interpretation is to “arouse the analysand’s curiosity
and kick-start his or her associations” (Fink, 1993, p 45). Thus, it is better for
interpretations to be enigmatic and polyvalent. After all, this is how the unconscious
works, unlike the conscious mind, which tends toward rationality. It is not directed at the
conscious mind. In this view an interpretation is not correct, but productive; not
incorrect, but unproductive. A provocative, enigmatic interpretation allows for work to
be done inside the patient; it opens a space for the “working through” so vital to the
process.
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In summary, interpretation cannot be separated from listening- a listening for the
desire that lies beneath the demand. This requires neither falling into satisfying the
demand, nor giving explanations or empathy (it makes no concrete provision).
Interpretation should arouse curiosity. Interpretation should be speech that is enigmatic
and polyvalent, or what Lacan calls “oracular speech”. The best interpretation interrupts,
surprises, and is ambiguous. This is quite different from Freud’s interpretations in the
case of Dora, in which he sought to pin down the exact hidden meaning and tell it to
Dora. “The fundamental assumption was that the interpretation unmasks a hidden
meaning” (Evans, 1996, p. 88). For, Lacan it works not as discovery, but as disruption.
One must interfere with the normal way of making sense, which tends to deny the desire
underlying a demand.
The Clinical Relationship
The clinical relationship is influenced by the patient’s attitude toward
psychoanalysis. As with hypnotism, a patient’s belief, or suggestibility, may influence
the treatment. Hypnotism functioned as a sort of miracle healing. Freud was careful to
differentiate his psychoanalytic cure, emphasizing that it involves work. The analytic
process itself is a process of “working through”. As Lacan’s critique of ego psychology
shows, he is adamant that work on the ego, or the imaginary level, is not a properly
psychoanalytic cure. This influences the clinical relationship at the deepest level.
Therapeutic action is not a result of the analyst’s superior knowledge, or normality, or
gentler superego. If there is any authority at all it is to be found in the patient’s
unconscious. However, the manifestation of the patient’s unconscious can be
uncomfortable and strange. Slips of the tongue, strange dreams, or contradictory,
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illogical motives are likely to be disavowed. It is a kind of work that patients may be
interested in avoiding.
The disavowal of the unconscious is made more palpable in analysis, because
patients become much more aware of their unconscious in treatment. This may be their
first time confronting and questioning their motives in such a focused way. As Fink,
(1993) points out, “the unconscious ‘within’ the analysand is rejected by the analysand
and projected onto the analyst” (p. 161). This is because the patient associates the sudden
rise in unconscious manifestations with the analyst. Further, the patient is likely to deny
responsibility. So, it is a dangerous temptation for the analyst to assume this position of
the one who knows: the master. As such the analyst then takes over responsibility for the
work. It is precisely this position that Freud took up with Dora, and which was cause for
so much protest. Yet, Lacan’s critique centers on the fact that this placed Freud on the
imaginary level, which absolutely takes away the power of the treatment.
To review, the imaginary is the level of the self-image, the ego, identifications,
rivalry, etc. When analysts puts themselves on this level they become a person like any
other person in the patient’s life (an “other”), and the patient measures him or herself
against the analyst. This can result in a power struggle, as it did in the case of Dora, and
lead to deleterious results. As with interpretation, the clinical relationship should shake
up the patient’s self understanding. It should draw attention away from imaginary
statements that objectify the subject, like: “I’m the kind of person who…” or “My
friend’s think I’m…” which are only increased in imaginary level, ego-strengthening
relationships.
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The symbolic is at a radically different level. Lacan introduces the big Other to
signify the Law. This is the subject’s relationship to parents, school, nation, religion,
media, etc. All of which inculcate the subject with ideals. These are structural Others
that shapes the very form that desire and satisfaction can take. It is here, in discovering
the fantasy that structures the relationship between the subject’s desire relative to the
Other that Lacan finds to be the true work of psychoanalysis.
The superego, is similar to this big Other; however there are important
differences. The ideal-ego is the small other, that one compares oneself to. Of course
this is not in the symbolic, rather it concerns one’s self-image and the imaginary in terms
of comparison. The ego-ideal is the one watching us (through whom we observe
ourselves). Now this is related to the symbolic and the big Other, because the subject
feels the need to show the ego-ideal that s/he can live up to the ideals and values expected
of him or her. This is the difference between sibling rivalry and seeking approval from
parents, clearly these are structurally different. Now, the superego is not this, but rather a
punitive agency that makes demands and produces guilt. Lacan does not view it as an
ethical agency; rather it forces one to enjoy (Lacan, 1992). Lacan does not, as an ego
psychologist might, advocate increasing the good identification (ego-ideal) and
decreasing the bad identification (superego, a la Strachey). In that case, the problem is
not that the superego is too harsh, but that one has, through these identifications, fallen
afoul of desire. As Lacan says in his seminar on ethics of psychoanalysis, "The only
thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire" (1992,
p. 310).
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For Lacan, the symbolic is the realm of the unconscious and the Other; the
imaginary is the ego and the other. The goal is to “pierce through the imaginary
dimension that veils the symbolic” (p. 165). This is the more primary, constitutive
dimension. In “The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power” (Lacan,
2006) Lacan uses a bridge metaphor, which illustrates the clinical relationship.
In a game of bridge, there are four players. The players pertain to the clinical
relationship as follows: the analyst as ego, the analyst as Other (the “dummy” in bridge),
the patient as ego, and the patient’s unconscious. The analyst’s first aim is to be the
“dummy” and not act as an ego. As Lacan says, “the analyst enlists what in bridge is
called the dummy [le mort], but he does so in order to bring out a fourth player who is to
be the analysand’s partner” (p. 492). The goal of the clinical relationship is not to have
ego to ego contact between the analyst and patient. Rather as Fink (1995) puts it, “The
analyst’s goal is to get the analysand as ego to guess his own partner’s hand” (p. 5).
Position of the Analyst
Lacan’s position of the analyst is starkly different from those presented in Chapter
Three. Unlike ego psychology, he does not advocate an analysis of the resistance, and
neither is the analyst to act as a model of a less harsh superego. And unlike object
relations one should not act as a parent, providing missed developmental needs.
Certainly, introspection, better adjustment to society, and nurturance could be beneficial
(the ego does have to make its way through a social world), but this is not the domain of
psychoanalysis. One only need to look at the case of Dora to see how wrongheaded
“adaptation to reality” can be; psychoanalysis has an offensive history of its practitioners
“helping” homosexuals adjust to the “reality” of heterosexuality, and this is but one
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example of that error. Freud had warned against this turning of the patient into the
analyst’s “private property” and acting “with the pride of a Creator to form him in our
own image and see that it is good… this is after all only to use violence” (Freud, 1919, p.
164). While this is clearly objectionable, it is not the main focus of this project. Still, it
is worthwhile noting the disavowal of the analyst, an ethical position against utilizing the
power of suggestion.
Again, the main focus is the differentiation of the imaginary and symbolic level.
Lacan utilizes these concepts to formalize the above critique and explain that the analyst
who presents him or herself as an ideal ego or role model is in the imaginary and avoids
the symbolic. To return to the bridge metaphor, Lacan argued that the analyst should
take the position of the “dummy”. Why does Lacan advocate this abnegation of the
analyst’s being? He says of the analyst, “the more his being is involved the less sure he
is of his action” (2006, p. 491). When an analyst works on the imaginary it is only to
work on the ego, to strengthen it, and in fact to offer the analyst’s own orientation to
reality as a model. As has been shown above, one cannot be so sure of one’s “goodness”.
Not only does being a “dummy” avoid such an imposition, but it also avoids the selfdefense that Freud had to engage in with Dora. The imaginary introduces a power
struggle, which has no analytic benefit; and the imaginary misses the larger picture.
Finally, even in transference interpretation, “the analyst’s speech is still heard as coming
from the transferential Other” (2006, p. 494). There is no way to be “real” and escape the
transference, because the analyst will always be “what the subject imputes the analyst to
be” (2006, p. 494).
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The analyst is to avoid judging, including normalization, nor should he or she use
their authority to comfort. It is common enough for the patient to project their
unconscious onto the analyst, and it is also likely that the patient will protect his or her
own superego. The patient may seek approval as well as judgment. If it seems this can
be earned they may ignore their own desire, focusing on how to identify with the analyst
instead. Lacan calls for “analytic neutrality” and expects the analyst to take “the position
of the pure dialectician” (p. 102). He says plainly that the transference marks “the
moments when the analyst goes astray” (p. 103). These of course are critiques of the
imaginary. There is a symbolic response to the transference and that is, rather than
focusing on the dual relationship of the transference, interpreting the content of
transference.
Just as Lacan critiqued Freud’s wanting to help Dora too much, the desire to
understand (to know the answer) or fulfill demands (to make them happy) is not what
motivates an analyst. The desire of the analyst has paradoxically been called by Lacan as
“the non-desire to cure” (1992, p. 218). And along with the analyst’s abnegation of
being, Lacan also stated, “The less you understand the better you listen” (Lacan, Seminar
II, p. 141).

In light of this relation to knowledge, Lacan diverges from Freud’s

archaeologist and detective and uses the metaphor of the analyst as a Socrates or Zen
master. Both strategically avoid any giving of “the answer”. Like the bridge metaphor
these figures illustrate how the position of the analyst is meant to provoke a desire in the
patient. Simply it is meant to incite curiosity to examine the unconscious. This
abstinence can aggravate the patient (and the analyst), but it must be held.
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Lacan gives a fairly straightforward account of the goal of psychoanalysis: to
move from empty speech to full speech. Empty speech is the self-objectifying speech
shown above. It may correspond to reality (“I’m an introvert”), but it misses the larger
question of the symbolic and the structuring fantasy shown in Dora’s imago. For
example, what is the subject’s relationship to the Other that has so structured this
introversion? Full speech corresponds to desire and not reality. There is more truth in
desire than the facts the subject presents of his ego. So if the goal is to reach full speech,
then the analyst has a role to play. Not as a mother or stronger ego. The analyst does not
cure through empathy, support, or with their superior knowledge or authenticity. The
analyst is to occupy the position of the unknown, the unconscious, the Other. In this way
as Nobus (1992) says “the analyst is the instrument which enables the patient to make a
full statement” (p. 66).
Summary
Lacan returns to Freud by highlighting the significance of the unconscious. The
subject is “divided between a truth it disavows and a conviction to which it clings”
(Verhaeghe, p. 237). It is through the psychoanalytic process of questioning meanings,
questioning motives, and questioning desire that the subject reaches a point where they
can experience a shift in regard to their relation to their desire. In the case of Dora and
the three dialectical reversals, Lacan showed the development of the subject through an
awareness of one’s own collusion, the enjoyment concealed in complaint, and the
emergence of one’s relationship to desire vis-à-vis the Other.
As has been discussed above, the revelations of the unconscious are disavowed
and ignored because they are so difficult to bear. For this reason, Lacan has at times said
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that the end of analysis comes when the subject can face his own mortality (Lacan, 1953).
The position of the analyst offers a different kind of relationship, one that emphasizes
manifestations of the unconscious. So the analyst is one who maintains a disciplined
attention upon these revelations as well as one who can endure self-abnegation and the
strange and painful manifestations of the patient.
The next section synthesizes the project’s findings. To do so will require that
some concepts are developed further. Desire has played a central role in Lacan’s
conception of therapeutic action. Both desire as a question and desire of the analyst will
be further explored. So too will the discourse of the analyst, which is one of Lacan’s four
discourses.
The Dora Case and the Four Discourses
Psychoanalysis was developed (by a self-proclaimed hysteric) through a dialogue
with hysteria. This dialogue has produced a knowledge and practice. The case of Dora
presents readers with an example of a divided subject suffering from a lack in the
symbolic. Dora had a question: What is a woman? Or more generally: What am I
supposed to be? There was no ready answer for her to resolve this question. Freud
intervened; Lacan criticized his interventions as those of a “master”. In Seminar XVII,
Lacan (2007) introduced the four discourses: the hysteric, the master, the university, and
the analyst. Each of these deals with this problem of symbolic lack in a different way. It
will not be possible to give a detailed study of the four discourses, but a brief overview
will provide a beneficial addition to the current investigation into the high value Lacan
places on the symbolic order for psychoanalysis. First, the four discourses show a key
way in how Lacan’s teaching is different from Freud’s. These discourses are abstract,
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rather than based on myths like Narcissus or Oedipus. Lacan was highly influenced by
structuralism, particularly structural linguistics.
Again, the dialogue of psychoanalysis is conducted between the master and
hysteric. How exactly does this work? The master presents him or herself as one who
has no lack and is at one with knowledge. The hysteric seeks out a master and viceversa. The master needs the hysteric in order to show s/he knows everything. The
hysteric needs the master, because s/he puts her questions for someone else to solve
(Lacan, 2007). This was clearly relevant to the case of Dora.
The university discourse, somewhat ancillary to this project, is a result of the
formalization of the master. The textbook perhaps provides the best example. This
recalls the “hackneyed phrases” that Lacan feels Freud as master has been reduced to by
ego psychology. The most important discourse for the purposes of this study is of course
the discourse of the analyst. It should be said that while analytic discourse is unique it
does not provide the ultimate answer; it is not a meta-theory (Lacan, 2007). Rather, it
simply defines what a psychoanalytic intervention is composed of: a radical questioning
of desire.
Lacan (2007), as an analyst and contrary to the promise of the master, said,
“Don’t expect anything more subversive in my discourse than that I do not claim to have
a solution” (p. 70). The analyst is not one who answers, but one who questions. Just as in
Lacan’s critique of the case of Dora, the importance of this questioning is to produce a
dialectical development of truth. However, Lacan had developed his theory far beyond
what he presented in that early critique.
Traumatic Real, Symbolic Lack, Imaginary Answer
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Due to the nature of human reality certain gaps exist in understanding and
meaning, these can cause anxiety to the point of being traumatic. A la Freud the child
comes up with sexual theories and fantasies as an attempt to “bridle the Real where the
Symbolic fails” (p. 242). Verhaeghe (1999) presents a fairly clear dramatization of the
hysterical subject’s dilemma beginning with Freud’s “primary fantasy” and moving on to
Lacan’s elaborations. In the beginning, the child’s first Other (the mother) separates
from the child and the symbiotic paradise is lost. This is the result of the subject’s
splitting; anything we could call pure nature is lost, as the child becomes a speaking
human being. This is a movement from the pre-Oedipal into the Oedipal, or from the
real/imaginary into the symbolic. The child, in the face of lack (the lost unity) must
wonder what the Other desires and must make sense of his/her condition. This is the
symbolic lack and it is complicated by the unspeakable nature of desire, which can only
be expressed imperfectly through signifiers. The child takes this lack in the Other as a
demand. The child wants to be loved and so tries to make him or herself (into an image)
of what the Other desires (1999). The symptom can be seen as an interpretation gone
awry. As Verhaeghe (1999) states, “fantasies elaborate an understanding a posteriori of
what was originally not understood” (p. 42). As Lacan points out the position of the
hysteric is, in a sense, an existential condition shared by all subjects, and in the analytic
process the patient is necessarily “hystericized” (2007). This means they will be brought
into a state of anxiety concerning the failure of the imaginary solution.
As discussed above, there is a fundamental disharmony between lived experience
and the self-image. Hollywood movies provide a perfect example of how the imaginary
attempts to cover the anxiety caused by the symbolic lack. A problem is presented,
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usually having to do with a sexual relationship or one’s place in the world, and the
impasse is impossibly covered by an imaginary solution of true love: fulfillment and
completeness. This can be found less benignly in neurotic symptoms, which are
particularly visible in hysterics (“the body speaks”). This gets to the fundamental
difference of Lacanian psychoanalysis and ego psychology. The ego as self-image is
what people are constantly trying to care for and manage. People feel shame for an
action or thought because it contradicts how they see themselves or how they want to be
seen by the Other. However, there is no final imaginary solution, because the lack
resides in the symbolic. The solution is not to strengthen the ego or orient the neurotic to
reality and make them feel better about themselves. Rather, the ego is strong enough, and
it is in the “traversal” of the fantasy that a symbolic shift might occur. In one sense,
when one makes meaning of a traumatic experience it binds some of the anxiety; in
another, taking unconscious material into account, or integrating it, allows the subject to
stop fighting it and relax.
Again, the fantasy is regarded as an attempt to arrive at a suitable answer when
confronted by the enigmatic desire of the Other. This primary fantasy has a huge
influence on how the subject comports him or herself through the world, though it is not
easily discovered. The fantasy is taken as reality, for it supports the subject’s orientation
to reality. The unconscious logic that supports the subject is spoken in symptoms,
dreams, and fantasies and is regarded as an interruption by an “other” discourse. It is this
discourse- the unconscious- that must be questioned and not ignored in favor of the ego.
In a way, this involves moving backward by breaking down the certainty of the
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imaginary solution- not easy because it is a construction that one depends upon for
meaning- and a confrontation with the symbolic lack.
The Structure of Desire
As Freud’s case and Lacan’s elaborations have shown, Dora was looking for
something that wasn’t there when she was confronted by a traumatic real. Part of the
problem was the unconventional, secret nature of the arrangement in which there was no
suitable way for Dora to react. However the Oedipal complex is instructive here- not as
the reductive, hackneyed “desire for parent of opposite sex” but in the way it- qua the
Other- structures desire. Dora’s mother was not represented in the case study. So the
trouble was that Dora’s Oedipal structuring was incomplete. As a structure of two- Dora
and her father- it was limited to the dual and imaginary. Dora was probably attempting to
enforce the Oedipal structure by involving Frau K. in an identificatory chain with her
father. Her dreams, which involved her mother and father, were looking for something
that wasn’t there. This is further evidenced in that questions of femininity were
represented in a variety of guises. Verhaeghe (1999) comments that Freud had perhaps
grown tired of his hysteric patients’ endless displacements. Since his days as a hypnotist
Freud had been looking for the single cause of neurosis. First it was sexual trauma and
then fantasies, but each time his patients were unable to stop, always finding something
more. So with Dora, Freud enforced and answer (Herr K.) and stopped the
displacements. However, as a dialectic process this is precisely what Lacan finds to be
the work of analysis. It is not a specific discovery that unlocks the mystery of the
symptom, rather the displacements, expressed in a metonymy of desire, reveal a structure.
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This is a point that this project must not fail to stress. There is no secret answer, rather
there is an underlying structure.
Though much of Lacan’s work emphasizes the signifier, this project has focused
more upon aspects of fantasy. For this reason, the “traversal of the fantasy” introduced
by Lacan in Seminar XI provides an able analogue to the “working through” that Freud
had proposed (Lacan, 1981). Through the work of analysis the subject begins to question
their trust in their fantasies, which supports the position they have adopted. The
construction of the fantasy has been presented as a subject’s response to the Other, which
was felt as anxiety or even trauma. Not knowing or understanding can be unbearable.
Here there is some agreement with the discoveries of neurobiology, in that the mind has a
compulsion to make meaning (Cozolino, 2002). The subject felt that there was a demand
to fill in the lack. As the “enigmatic” analyst takes the place of the object a and provokes
this questioning, the subject may feel a new freedom from obligation. As Verhaeghe
(1999) explains, “the journey through one’s fantasy paradoxically end[s] in the subject’s
dropping out of it” (p. 146). This is also called the destitution of the subject (Lacan,
2006), in which one gives up the meaning of the fantasy and accepts the pure contingency
of his or her situation. So, as the survey of therapeutic action suggested, the analyst must
become a kind of object that both provokes and interrupts. It should be clear by now that
this Lacanian object is radically different than those presented in mainstream
psychoanalysis.
The desire of the analyst is not knowledge, but the process itself of revealing the
structure of desire. Like Socrates or a Zen master, the analyst does not answer the
question. This lack of an answer means that the question is given back to the patient
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without any collaboration. The gift the analyst gives is nothing; s/he makes no provision.
Through this position the patient is left to question the Other as it exists in them- after
many dialectical reversals, of course- in the fundamental fantasy. As Nobus (1991) puts
it, the analyst helps the patient to “question the trust they had put in their fantasies” (p.
136). In this way they “unknot” fantasy and meaning, foregoing an imaginary solution
and facing the lack in the symbolic.
However, this solution is not to be understood as a more adapted orientation to
reality or making up for a deficit like other psychoanalytic schools. Reality is always
mediated by the Other; no amount of authenticity can bridge this gap. Rather than
identifying with the analyst, the treatment reaches its end when the patient will have
achieved a radical difference. For in the beginning the patient had hoped the analyst
would provide the answer, but the analyst in the end has nothing to give. The patient is
initiated into an awareness of what they have. This is nothing but the symptom, though
how it plays out is limited by fantasy; in fact, given a chance there is a much greater
possibility for its employ.
Lacan also explained the analytic situation as an ethical one in Seminar VII
(1992). Following Freud, Lacan finds fault with conventional morality, yet does not see
an answer in a sort of uninhibited release. As a critic of ego psychology the answer is
certainly not supposed to be adaptation, which would be normative. In fact, Lacan states
that, “a radical repudiation of a certain ideal of the good is necessary” (p. 230). Analysis
does not offer health or happiness. This “good” is of a duplicitous nature. Further, the
analyst is marked by a refusal of power or knowledge.
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In Seminar XI, Lacan suggests that the end of analysis results in an “absolute
difference” (Lacan, 1992). As has been indicated throughout, the analyst avoids anything
resembling mastery or domination. Since so much of what keeps the symptom in place is
identification, Lacan particularly stresses that the patient should not identify with the
analyst. Of course, there is communication. The symptom is a result of a failure of
communication (Lacan, 2006). Communication always says less and more than what is
intended. In fact, Lacan says the patient is always speaking to himself as well, which is
not as strange as it might sound (the Other has been internalized after all). With this in
mind Evans (1996) stated that the “task of the analyst is to enable the analysand to hear
the message he is unconsciously addressing to himself” (p. 26). The subject must come
to admit, accept, or otherwise appreciate, the truth of his or her desire.
This amounts to, in a sense, the assumption of responsibility for one’s desire. This
is quite the opposite of working with an autonomous ego toward adaptation. To the
contrary, it is unconscious desire that is the object of study in psychoanalysis.
Identification in a dual relationship will do nothing to unlock the subject from the
captivation of the imaginary. Rather, work in the symbolic can reveal a structure of
desire that might be considered the unique organization of the subject. Then, perhaps, the
subject may “enjoy” the symptom not as a passive symptom but as an agent of this
unique contingency of desire.
Conclusion
This project has made an in depth exploration of Lacan’s claim that therapeutic
action takes place at the level of the symbolic order. Freud’s case of Dora supplied a
background, and contemporary accounts of therapeutic action focused the investigation.
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Lacan’s critique of the Dora case and ego psychology helped to clarify the significance
between working at the imaginary or symbolic order.
As such, this study should help to expand the limited understanding of Lacan’s
theory in clinical social work. While there is no intent to suggest that Lacanian
psychoanalytic thought is an appropriate fit for all patients or situations, it offers a clear
alternative to contemporary theory and technique. Though a focus on the therapeutic
action of the symbolic order is far from exhaustive it is an important first step. Lacan is
often considered too difficult to read and avoids easy comprehension. This has led to a
current climate in which Lacan is underrepresented or misrepresented in curriculum and
training texts. However, it is clear that Lacanian thought is at a stage of increased
attention. Recent works that suggest the theoretical and practical utility of his thought
include: Schopenhauer's Porcupines: Intimacy and Its Dilemmas by Deborah Luepnitz
(2003), On Being Normal and Other Disorders: A Manual for Clinical Psychodiagnostics
by Paul Verhaeghe (2004), The Unsayable: The Hidden Language of Trauma by Annie
Rogers (2007), and Patricia Gherovici’s Please Select Your Gender: From the Invention
of Hysteria to the Democratizing of Transgenderism (2010).
While the research involved in this investigation has brought its author to a place
of increased understanding, the project it not particularly groundbreaking. Rather, it is a
first step in suggesting that Lacan has a place in social work as a viable alternative and
useful tool in clinical practice. The methodology is limited to a somewhat archaic case
and may be better served to show Lacanian technique’s usefulness in a contemporary
case. However, this limit was also a key way of linking Lacan with Freud and
reinvigorating the drive model- one that is not limited by biological ties to instinct or
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simplistic views of insight. Hopefully, a more nuanced understanding of Freud and
Lacan will be incorporated into social work education. It appears a new generation of
practitioners are going to Lacan and psychoanalysis to a very different place. This
project aligns itself with that spirit: working out a viable, workable form for many people
while keeping its unique focus on the desiring subject.
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